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Abstract
Maintaining preparedness for a disaster is a patient and provider safety issue that is often
not a priority for hospital planning; however, the inability to implement and evaluate
disaster/emergency preparedness programs may render hospitals and the overall
healthcare system fragile and dysfunctional amidst such crises. Priorities such as
emergency-department overcrowding and lack of funding emerge daily and contribute to
the inability of hospitals to respond appropriately to unexpected events. This study was
conducted with the aim to assess the correlation between disaster/emergency
preparedness and related problems, policy, and politics. A cross-sectional survey design
was used to determine whether problems, policy, and politics perceived by Tennessee
acute-care hospital nurses predicted the disaster/emergency preparedness of their
hospitals. A multiple linear regression model was applied to assess the effects of
disaster/emergency problems, policy, and politics on disaster/emergency preparedness. A
regression equation was created with respect to problems, policy, and politics predictor
variables with age, gender, education, and location used as confounding variables. The
results of the study revealed that policy (β = 0.41, p =.01) and politics (β = 0.26, p =.02)
were related to disasters/emergencies, and these two significant variables can be used to
predict disaster preparedness. In summary, disaster/emergency policy and politics predict
preparedness within healthcare settings, including hospitals. These findings are
suggestive of the urgent need for social change to require, develop, and implement a
statewide hospital and overall standardized healthcare disaster/emergency-preparedness
system with surveillance and monitoring for indicators of occurrence.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Overview
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), coupled with subsequent
anthrax threats, underscored the inadequacy of U.S. emergency-response capabilities. In
2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita further accentuated the substandard nature of domestic
preparedness for effective emergency response across the nation. Such disasters and
attacks are catalysts for a chain of reactive activities designed to enhance emergencyresponse capabilities (Duley, 2005). In 2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(U.S. DHS; 2008) devised a national response framework to guide the development of a
national all-hazards emergency-response system. An entire section outlined a response
framework for public-health and medical services. However, a substantial functional gap
exists between federal mandates and actual hospital preparedness (Cherry & Trainer,
2008).
The 2009 and 2010 influenza epidemics overwhelmed emergency departments
(EDs) across the United States. Thousands of individuals sought treatment from an
already overburdened system, demonstrating that the problem of surge capacity had yet
to be resolved with an effective method of enhancing ED capabilities to manage the large
influx of patients. With the added outbreaks of highly fatal viruses, such as Ebola, the
paramount importance of EDs prepared for nearly any eventuality became clear. Hospital
size, facility capabilities, and medical specialties vary considerably; however, several
characteristics pose consistent themes. These include increased overcrowding, boarding
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of admitted patients within the EDs, ED closures, and nursing-staff shortages (Kellerman,
2006).
Derlet, Richards, and Kravitz (2001) conducted a quantitative study inclusive of a
comprehensive literature review. These researchers found no consensus as to a definition
of ED overcrowding nor any specific numeric threshold to scientifically quantify such
conditions. Research has indicated that overcrowding equates to a demand for emergency
care exceeding the ability of emergency-response providers and ED resources (Derlet et
al., 2001). The demand impedes the provision of care within a reasonable amount of time
and forces caregivers to work within environments too pressured to provide quality care.
These circumstances are reported daily by many EDs in the United States (Derlet et
al.,2001). Consequently, effectively managing disasters may be beyond the existing
capabilities of these pivotal emergency-care facilities.
Background of the Study
Prior to 1978, the U.S. Congress attempted to meet the need for national
emergency preparedness primarily by applying fragmented strategies void of a unified
structure or defined approach. Domestic preparedness hinged on ad hoc legislative action
often motivated by policy designed to garner funding (Federal Emergency Management
Agency [FEMA], 2010). The first disaster legislation on record was the Congressional
Act of 1803 (as cited in FEMA, 2010), which allocated assistance to a New Hampshire
town devastated by fire. Over subsequent years, several agencies were created or
delegated the responsibility of administering disaster relief. These agencies ranged from
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, commissioned in 1932 following an earthquake,
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to myriad civil-defense agencies including the Department of Agriculture. Most of these
organizations served in a reactive capacity lacking a coordinated agenda.
The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (as cited in Bechtel, Betz, Deppe, Gels, & Haley,
2004) required a presidential declaration and provided limited resources for disaster aid.
However, as transportation, nuclear-regulation, and natural-hazard concerns increased,
more than 100 agencies became involved at some level in disaster management, which
complicated the management and oversight of responsibilities. In 1978, the FEMA was
created to adhere to Executive Order 12148 with the objective of coordinating all
disaster-relief efforts. The Agency was accountable for both disaster relief and civil
defense. In 2003, the FEMA was absorbed by the U.S. DHS. Founded by President Bush
in 2001, this department was designed by combining several federal agencies to
coordinate multiple functions such as law enforcement, disaster preparedness and
response, border control, and civil defense.
Inclusion of Health Care
The U.S. DHS, along with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(U.S. DHHS), supported hospital preparedness and the sequencing of disasterpreparedness funding (as cited in Bechtel et al., 2004). The Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA) was the “arm” of the U.S. DHHS charged with
providing resources to medically underserved populations. This organization was also
responsible for advancing the preparedness of U.S. hospitals, particularly by enhancing
their capacity to manage public-health emergencies including bioterrorism through the
provision of guidance and financial resources.
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In 2006, the management of funding for emergency preparedness was moved to
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Recovery, another agency
within the U.S. DHHS. The management of emergency services and health funding
remains under the auspice of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and
Recovery while the HRSA now manages funding for fire and law-enforcement
preparedness. A noteworthy change is that the funds formerly managed by the HRSA
were earmarked for medical response and primarily directed toward hospitals, while
funding under the authority of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and
Recovery is allocated to a broader recipient base to supplement state and local initiatives
supporting hospitals and health systems during public-health emergencies. Drawbacks are
the increase in lack of funding, regardless of the growth in recipients, as well as the
decrease in funding allocated to hospital preparedness (National Association of Public
Hospitals and Health Systems, 2007).
The economic condition of many hospitals has also dramatically declined,
limiting their ability to support programs that do not generate revenue. This phenomenon
has continued, even in light of recent policy shifts such as those introduced by
implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010). This Act
created a new challenge for U.S. hospitals tasked with accommodating approximately 30
million Americans becoming healthcare consumers who were formerly uninsured.
Additionally, new health-coverage schemes compressed networks and limited higher cost
healthcare providers, forcing many organizations to reduce their rates to remain
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competitive. This shift in insurance strategy is forcing independent, free-standing
hospitals and providers to consolidate; merge; or be acquired by larger, more competitive
organizations.
Many Americans rely upon their employers to supply healthcare benefits that
cease when their employment ends. The employed are also impacted because economic
crises force many employers to reduce healthcare benefits or structure plans with
employee copayments that are costly and often unaffordable for workers. The result is yet
another increase in underinsured individuals and newly insured patients seeking care in
EDs. The billing for these high-cost services often goes unpaid.
With the introduction of The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010,
a greater number of Americans now have healthcare coverage in the form of Medicaid (as
cited in the American College of Emergency Physicians [ACEP], 2014). However, this
insurance covers less of the cost of services and, due to a shortage of primary-care
providers, newly insured individuals continue to seek care in EDs. The result is increased
service consumption coupled with low or absent compensation. This contributes to
declining operating margins. When combined with the high cost of maintaining
technology to support ever-increasing standards of care, the declining consumption of
revenue-generating services, such as surgery, and the low reimbursement rates of
Medicare and Medicaid, a significant financial shortfall characterizes the overall
healthcare environment (Kiselev, 2010).
The economic struggles of hospitals force tough strategic decisions related to the
manner in which funds are allocated. Funding is channeled to programs with the greatest
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return on investment and generation of revenue. Meanwhile, costly, and infrequently used
programs, such as disaster preparedness, are relegated to a lesser position of need than
revenue-generating operations. Therefore, disaster preparedness often receives solely the
support needed to satisfy minimum regulatory standards.
In January of 2001, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO) added preparedness for chemical- and biological-agent exposure
to the existing requirement for emergency preparedness (as cited in Toner et al., 2009).
This was one of the first initiatives outlining and defining a specific standard of hospital
emergency preparedness. In 2004, the Commission introduced standards for ED
overcrowding that focused on enhancing patient throughput (JCAHO, 2004a). A
preliminary set of standards for emergency-management planning was outlined, dictating
that such planning must be adequate for effective response to multiple types of events
with escalating, flexible capabilities for the management of infection control and disaster
response (JCAHO, 2006b). As noted earlier, the U.S. DHS (2008) developed a national
response framework to guide the development of a national all-hazards emergencyresponse system. Each plan calls for conducting a hazard analysis and establishing
structure for disaster/emergency care.
Governmental Funding for Healthcare Preparedness
Prior to 9/11, the U.S. DHHS budget allocated less than 2% toward healthcare
preparedness, with a small fraction of this allocation directed to hospital personnel (as
cited in De-Lorenzo, 2007). Following the anthrax attacks of 2001, funding for health
preparedness began to improve with a grant of $135 million awarded February 15, 2001
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for healthcare preparedness. Funding gradually increased, peaking at $515 million in
2003 and 2004. However, in 2006, funding declined with only $350 million of a $3.8
billion healthcare preparedness budget earmarked for public-health flu preparedness.
Complicating this funding decline, a change in homeland-security philosophy emerged in
2006, shifting the burden of healthcare preparedness to local communities and hospitals
in the form of a national strategy for pandemic flu. With millions of patients contracting
avian flu in 2009, only $362 million was budgeted for healthcare preparedness (Toner et
al., 2009).
Federal grant programs for disaster preparedness have been a positive asset in
aiding hospital preparedness; however, such funding is a small proportion of the
resources necessary to establish and maintain all-hazards preparedness. Toner et al.
(2009) estimated the cost of preparing a 164-bed hospital for pandemic flu at $1 million,
with an annual maintenance cost of $200,000. Flu preparedness is one small component
of all-hazards preparedness. Preparing for natural disasters that bring large numbers of
trauma patients to hospital facilities involves the inclusion of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear preparedness, in addition to knowledge surrounding improvised
explosives, all of which introduce unique needs. Such needs require varied resources,
specific training, and sophisticated facility capabilities such as decontamination,
isolation, and personal protective equipment. The average related federal grant is between
$5,000 and $10,000 per hospital facility, which is woefully inadequate to institute and
maintain disaster preparedness, as supported by the Toner et al. estimate.
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Additional Challenges
Concurrent with the described preparedness issues, EDs encounter daily
difficulties from operating beyond capacity. Consequences have included throughput
obstructions from an inadequate number of available beds or staff to manage the volume
of patients requiring admission. This has led to the boarding of admitted patients within
the ED, which has, in turn, resulted in an inability to accommodate patients needing
emergency care. This, in turn, introduces ambulance diversion to other facilities. ED
patient loads have increased dramatically since 1992 with a 32% annual increase in ER
visits (ACEP, 2009). Further compounding the problem, 7% of hospital EDs have closed
(ACEP, 2009).
ED overcrowding emerged during the 1980s. Incidence was initially isolated to
hospitals located within urban areas (Derlet & Richards, 2000). To date, ED
overcrowding has become a national problem due to the decreasing number of available
inpatient beds as well as a changing pattern of ED use by the general public. With the
financial need to improve efficiencies, inpatient beds have been reduced to correlate to
average daily census. Therefore, Gallagher and Lynn (1990) attributed the decreasing
number of inpatient beds to the shift in care provision to the outpatient setting and
improved case management resulting in shorter lengths of stay. This elimination of
unused beds and related resources has dramatically thwarted the ability of many hospitals
to manage the influx of patients during disasters.
Burt and McCaig (2001) found through quantitative study that patient acuity, as
well as the complexity of their health conditions, have increased with longevity. Derlet
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and Richards (2000) described a change in the pattern surrounding ED use. As noted
earlier, the number of underinsured across the United States has served to increase the
use of EDs as providers of primary care to avoid office visits with primary-care
physicians requiring payment at the time of services.
Hospital EDs are required to assess and treat, if needed, all patients presenting to
their care facilities. This provision was included in the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1985, which was created to protect the rights of
indigent patients pursuing emergency care. The legislation was a reaction to the practice
of patient “dumping,” which is hospitals or hospital-based doctors refusing to treat
uninsured patients with no other means of payment for care services. The EMTALA
dictated that all Medicare-participating hospitals must provide a medical-screening exam
and treatment to stabilize any emergency medical condition in all patients presenting to
the ED (Moy, 2011). Until there is a system in place for universal health care, the ED will
be the only milieu guaranteeing access to all patients for care. The EMTALA forces this
scenario without encouraging consumers to be responsible for their health care. Due to
the nature of the care provided by EDs, using these facilities for primary care creates
adverse issues such as fragmented care from loss of the treatment-plan follow through
that would routinely occur with a primary-care provider (ACEP, 2009).
As noted earlier, no clear consensus exists as to a definition of ED overcrowding.
However, Derlet et al. (2001) established a set of elements toward such definition. They
included (a) all ED beds filled for more than 6 hours per day, (b) patients admitted to a
hospital and boarded in the ED for more than 6 hours per day due to the unavailability of
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inpatient beds, and (c) EDs unable to manage new arrivals and hence forced to close or
divert ambulances to other facilities. The impact of these elements alone or in
combination creates gridlock in a process that is designed for continuous throughput.
The ACEP (2009) issued a national report card on the state of emergency
medicine. The report was designed to address the realities of the ED, which includes its
dual role as the provider of emergency care in crisis situations and as the safety net for
individuals with no other point of access for medical care. It expanded upon the earlier
version, drawing from data of the most up-to-date sources to assess five dimensions of
ED care. Based upon 116 metrics, the following five dimensions were weighted to obtain
a grade for each state and the District of Columbia, as well as the United States as a
whole: (a) access to emergency care (30%), (b) quality and patient-safety environment
(20%), (c) medical-liability environment (20%), (d) public health and injury prevention
(15%), and (e) disaster preparedness. The overall grade for the nation was C–, with
access to emergency care scoring a D–. The ACEP concluded that the needs of the
growing and aging U.S. population far exceed the number of existing hospital EDs. The
problem is exacerbated by the shortage of nurses and physicians, as well as the low
number of primary-care and specialty providers.
The report-card category of disaster preparedness is new to the ACEP (2009)
reporting structure. It was added to capture the disaster-planning initiatives that are
collectively becoming an integral facet of the emergency-care culture. The grade in this
category was a C+. The ACEP task force collected state-specific data. This dimension
targets the following four major areas essential to an effective medical response to a
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disaster: (a) state coordination, (b) hospital capacity, (c) availability of trained staff, and
(d) funding.
The ACEP report confirmed the position that federal funding for disaster
preparedness is inadequate (as cited in Cherry & Trainer, 2008). To compensate for this
inadequacy, high-ranking states heavily invested state and local funds in systems and
infrastructure that enable prompt and efficient response. Also noted by the ACEP, higher
performing states receive high per capita federal funding for disaster response. The sites
within these states have formal all-hazards medical-response protocols or Emergency
Support Function #8 plans in place, which are coordinated with emergency medical
services (EMS) and hospital personnel, among other enhancing factors. The ACEP
perceived the U.S. grade of C+ as a reflection of the lack of critical funding to augment
medical providers, as well as the lack of consistent direction by the federal government
despite the efforts invested in disaster preparedness by many states. The College made
eight recommendations for improving emergency care and called for emergency-care
professionals, government officials, and private citizens to be made aware of its statespecific report card and become active in supporting emergency-preparedness efforts.
In summary, many of the factors revealed thus far allude to policy decisions that
have negatively impacted the disaster-response capabilities of many hospitals.
Consequently, future expectations must include a stronger focus on overall preparedness
through the provision of enhanced training initiatives, planning for increased capacity,
and improved allocation of available resources. ED capacity is recognized as a critical
component of disaster/emergency response; however, within many hospitals, it is not
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given the support and priority to enable development of the necessary response
capabilities. Additionally, hospital preparedness, which is a key component of first
response in disasters, is not given the support, priority, and guidance from federal
agencies that is necessary to result in the allocation of funding and other resources
(Cherry & Trainer, 2008).
Problem Statement
Many U.S. hospitals are challenged with limited resources, stressed capacities,
and overcrowding on a daily basis. Federal expectations for hospitals are to have allhazards preparation in place, enabling effective response to a variety of natural and manmade disasters. Such response includes facilities, resources, and staff (Kellerman, 2006).
Many hospitals lack adequate equipment, resources, and training to provide a safe and
effective response to a mass casualty or hazardous-material exposure. This may
negatively affect the victims of a disaster if staff members are unprepared or lack the
resources to appropriately respond. However, the federal government has been providing
various levels of funding and support to the hospitals and public-health departments of
the country and, although great progress has been made in emergency preparedness,
emphasis wans when other priorities dominate (Duley, 2005).
The authorities and the management of U.S. healthcare centers are responsible for
the performance of relief and disaster teams at the time of an emergency. However, if
these authorities fail, for whatever reason, to prepare response teams properly and
effectively for disasters, patient care suffers (National Association of Public Hospitals
and Health Systems, 2008). Prompt and successful emergency services are therefore
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reliant upon hospital authorities providing proper training and education to employees.
The proper treatment of disaster victims is a pivotal facet of such training (Niska &
Shimizu, 2011).
Established disaster plans are critical to support response teams in their efforts to
provide medical emergency support to victims. It is also essential for hospitals to be
prepared for any emergency rescue operation that will require the availability of
necessary medicine, medical equipment, and treatment facilities specific to the disaster
response (Kellerman, 2006). Put simply, it is essential to reduce existing gaps between
the expectations of the federal government regarding disaster preparedness and the actual
preparedness of hospitals. This will contribute to improved EMS in times of disaster,
thereby providing a higher level of medical treatment to victims and, in turn, contributing
to rapid patient recovery and saved lives (Niska & Shimizu, 2011).
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the current research was to examine the gap between effective
hospital emergency preparedness and the related awareness and perceptions of healthcare
providers. Toward this end, statistics related to emergency-room preparedness have been
analyzed, and the perceptions of nurse leaders regarding the state of readiness within their
specific departments have been collected and examined. Federal expectations
surrounding hospital preparedness were compared to related survey responses from firstline ED caregivers. The findings of this study reflect the variance in the extent of
preparedness between hospitals and emphasize the level of awareness among providers
compared to preparedness expectations.
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Events since 2001 have increased public awareness of the threat of disaster, manmade or natural, and the need for a competent, adequate, and flexible emergencyresponse framework (Katz & Levi, 2008). The findings of this study expand the existing
body of knowledge surrounding the gap between preparedness and related expectations.
The current research may further provide an awareness of the current status of hospitals
and holds the potential to alter the perceptions of stakeholders and stimulate further
attention to the problem under study. The findings may provide greater understanding as
to why interest in the development of policy related to hospital emergency preparedness
has waned, as well as offer an avenue toward increasing needed attention (Kingdon,
2011).
To support the purpose of this study, I applied a quantitative research method with
the intent to analyze various factors such as the availability of facilities and resources;
preparedness policy, training, and education; and the perception of emergency-response
capabilities within U.S. hospitals. I conducted a survey with a sample of ED nurse
managers of Tennessee acute-care hospitals and correlated hypotheses to the research
questions in order to gain a clearer understanding of whether the healthcare institutions of
this particular region have met necessary standards for emergency preparedness. The
survey consisted of 73 questions and was distributed to acute-care institutions with a
dedicated ED within the state of Tennessee (see Appendix A). I analyzed the responses
using statistical tools and techniques to arrive at reliable and valid conclusions. The
principal objective was to understand how prepared participating hospitals were in
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responding to certain emergencies that could realistically occur within the country such
as natural disasters and terrorist attacks (Niska & Shimizu, 2011).
It is essential for the hospitals of any country to prepare for all hazards and
emergencies that could potentially occur from natural disasters or other incidents. Prompt
response is required, and it is essential for hospitals to minimize loss of life. U.S.
hospitals play a major role in the provision of such services to disaster-affected patients
(Duley, 2005). Continuous preparation is therefore critical, along with maintaining all of
the necessary facilities and resources that may be required for community support and
relief work. Hospitals must provide proper training and education to employees and
healthcare professionals so they can easily respond to unexpected situations while
effectively continuing routine emergency operations. The government also plays a major
role in the provision of sufficient funding and other support for these hospital initiatives,
assuring the necessary resources (National Association of Public Hospitals and Health
Systems, 2008). However, a gap exists between the expectations of the federal
government regarding disaster preparedness and the actual preparedness of hospitals. By
examining participating acute-care hospitals within the state of Tennessee, this study
contributes to closing this gap.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
It is important to establish clear goals from the onset of the research process.
Research questions form an integral facet of any study because they serve as a guide for
the research that will ultimately contribute substantively to the body of existing
knowledge surrounding the topic of study. As noted earlier, the current state of hospital
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preparedness within the United States was examined in the current research. The research
questions were answered via a comprehensive review of existing literature within this
field of study, along with an analysis of real-time perceptions and attitudes surrounding
this critical topic so integral to the very health and safety of the American population.
With consideration to Kingdon’s (2003) theory on streams of the policy
process—problems, policy, and politics—the following three research questions and
corresponding hypotheses were central to this study:
1. How do perceptions of resource, training, and budgetary problems relate to
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee?
Null Hypothesis 1 states that hospital EDs within the state of Tennessee are
not prepared to manage mass disaster incidents. Alternative Hypothesis 1
states that hospital EDs within the state of Tennessee are prepared to manage
mass disaster incidents.
2. How do perceptions of federal, state, and hospital policy and plans relate to
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee?
Null Hypothesis 2 states that first-line ED managers do not possess sufficient
knowledge and awareness of emergency preparedness and related publicpolicy expectations. Alternative Hypothesis 2 states that first-line ED
managers possess sufficient knowledge and awareness of emergency
preparedness and related public-policy expectations.
3. How do perceptions of external and internal organizational politics relate to
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee?
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Null Hypothesis 3 states that first-line ED care providers do not have positive
perceptions of the available resources, capabilities, and training within their
hospitals to manage a mass disaster. Alternative Hypothesis 3 states that firstline ED care providers have positive perceptions of the available resources,
capabilities, and training within their hospitals to manage a mass disaster.
The stated research questions were answered with a quantitative approach. This
methodology was the most beneficial for the study because the data compared were finite
and represented information and specific factors related to emergency preparedness. The
factors included, but were not limited to, a clear understanding of related requirements,
resource availability, and level of training. A published questionnaire served as the
foundation for a survey designed specifically for this study and was administered to
access quantitative data on the actual preparedness and awareness of a national response
framework. Closed-ended questions facilitated the collection of data, enabling a clearer
understanding of provider perceptions of emergency preparedness (see Appendix A).
The dependent variable in the current study was emergency preparedness. The
first set of independent variables were problem streams (i.e., resources, training,
infrastructure, budget, and recent mass-casualty events; Bascetta, 2010; De-Lorenzo,
2007; Hsu et al., 2006; Kingdon, 2011; Kiselev, 2010; Niska & Shimizu, 2011). The
second set of independent variables were policy streams (i.e., knowledge of federal
policy, knowledge of state and local policy, the development of hospital policy, and the
availability of disaster plans). The third set of independent variables were politics streams
(i.e., media relations, notable leadership actions, and recent mass-casualty events). A
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final independent variable was the location of the respective hospitals, in terms of urban,
suburban, or rural, in order to further define the participating facilities (see McLellan,
1998). This research was cross cultural through the selection of multiple hospitals.
Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical framework for the current study was Kingdon’s (2003) multiple
streams theory, which provides a dynamic systems perspective for explaining why some
issues command attention generating action by policy makers while others are largely
ignored or neglected. The Kingdon model consists of three streams—problems, policy,
and politics. Kingdon has used the term policy window to denote a brief window of
opportunity for taking action on a given initiative. The greater the degree of convergence
between problems, policy, and politics, the higher the probability of policy makers and
leaders acting on an issue. An agenda refers to a list of issues or problems that gain the
attention of government officials and others close to them at a specific point in time.
Kingdon (2003) acknowledged myriad negative conditions within problem
streams. Some problems are projected to center stage while others stagnate. Whether a
problem rises to the forefront and remains a focus of attention or whether it is eventually
overshadowed or simply languishes is contingent upon both objective data and the
intensity of interest the problem provokes. Kingdon coined the term policy entrepreneurs
to describe those who actively strive to gain the attention and support of government
officials in order to gain their commitment to act upon issues espoused by entrepreneurs,
which are then recognized as problems and added to the government agenda.
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The policy stream consists of ideas and proposals that are distributed for
discussion within networks composed of a range of actors including lobbyists,
administrators, academics, researchers, consultants, bureaucrats, journalists, and other
media figures, as well as congressional staff (Kingdon, 2003). Policy entrepreneurs are
adept at discerning the opening of a policy window and championing their ideas at that
pivotal juncture. The practical viability of a proposal, as well as the degree to which it is
congruent with the values of the policy actors, are key factors of the policy stream. The
policy stream can essentially be defined by the ability to sell ideas rather than generate
ideas.
The third stream of politics is driven by three influential forces the national mood,
campaigns by special-interest groups, and the ideological leanings of policy makers.
These forces are all highly dynamic in nature. The national mood can change
dramatically at any time, and elections produce change in the ideologies of policy
makers. Kingdon (2003) argued that while pressure groups have the capacity to thwart,
modify, or support proposals, they have less power to influence agendas than to
synthesize the national mood toward the prediction of elections. The Kingdon model
addresses the forces that change the status of problems over time, as well as those that
propel problems to the forefront.
Kingdon’s (2003) study involving four waves of interviews conducted from 1976
through 1979 explored two focal issues—health care and transportation. High- visibility
healthcare issues included national health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, and hospital
cost containment, which were, ironically, issues again in the forefront during 2013.
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Disaster/Emergency planning gained prominence with the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the
subsequent anthrax threats. These events underscored the critical role of public health
amid emergencies and served as a collective springboard for actions toward improving
the capacity of public health and for healthcare facilities to respond during crises (Centers
for Disease Control [CDC] & Prevention, 2008; Toner et al., 2009). In 2005, Hurricane
Katrina further highlighted the need for improving disaster/emergency preparedness
(Adams & Canclini, 2008; ACEP, 2006; JCAHO, 2006b; Rodriguez & Aguirre, 2006;
Taylor, 2007). The threat of pandemic influenza provided further momentum for medical
emergency preparedness (Hoffman & Nannini, 2008; Levy, 2009; Lotstein et al., 2008;
Phillips & Worthington, 2009; Rust et al., 2009).
Knowlton et al. (2009) conducted a quantitative study on the 2006 California heat
wave and predicted that intense heat waves would have a powerful impact on morbidity
and are expected to increase with global warming. This presented another consequent
need for emergency planning. Most recently, the Joplin, Missouri tornado, Hurricane
Sandy, and the Boston Marathon bombing brought further awareness to the ongoing need
for disaster preparedness. Hospital emergency preparedness straddles two broad issues
that are continually in the public eye—healthcare reform and national security. Katz and
Levi (2008) argued that public-health emergency preparedness (PHEP) must be an
integral facet of the discourse on healthcare reform. The Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act of 2006 mandated the development of a national emergency-response
plan (as cited in Bascetta, 2010); however, there is a sizable gap between this federal
mandate and actual preparedness (Cherry & Trainer, 2008). The Kingdon (2003) model
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offers a useful framework for illuminating the factors involved in raising awareness of
the gap between policy and practice related to hospital emergency preparedness.
Consequently, the construct is central to the attention and action of policy makers.
Kingdon’s (2003) theory can effectively explain the progression and momentum
in policy development; however, further study of organizational behavior informed this
current research. The work of Lewin (1951) is important in understanding how change
happens, particularly in light of the many factors that drive change, including the external
environment. Conversely, there are counterforces that restrain change and, within
organizations, push to maintain the status quo. This is relative to the current research
because sudden and catastrophic acts of terrorism, mega storms, and pandemics require,
among other things, the heightened skills, equipment, and education that will meet the
needs of supporting organizations. However, these occurrences are random and
infrequent, and continuous preparedness is costly and labor intensive. Consequently, all
facets of the driving forces must be considered to increase understanding surrounding
organizational behavior as it relates to emergency preparedness. The review of literature
conducted for this study further expands upon these forces, as well as obstacles to
preparedness.
Nature of the Study
The research method selected for this study was quantitative in nature, employing
a regression model to analyze the relationship between factors affecting hospital
emergency preparedness. This is consistent with the methodology used in the majority of
the research reviewed for this study. Data collection involved a questionnaire. This
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provided the opportunity to assess the level of preparedness within participating hospitals
and the current state of their EDs in relation to the availability of resources, staff training,
and related personnel perceptions. The survey facilitated the collection of data pertaining
to the frequency of ambulance diversion and the capability to flex capacity (see Appendix
A). The survey questions were designed to also collect data related to provider awareness
of government expectations surrounding preparedness, as well as their perceptions of the
ability of their employer hospitals to respond to disasters. The intent behind the current
study was to highlight the disparity between hospital preparedness and the awareness of
care providers regarding expectations related to the variables of available resources, staff
training, and related personnel perceptions. The research clarifies existing problems,
potential solutions, and suggested policy improvements. The study contributes to the
creation of an environment conducive to the introduction of effective policy into the
political stream.
Definitions
Definitions of healthcare terms are dynamic, obscure, and vary for many reasons,
including regional terminology, environmental variables, and regulatory expectations.
Healthcare terminology is often derived from observation of the state of wellness, illness,
or injury. Similar to any language, the jargon of the healthcare industry evolved to
enhance communication. Within the subculture of emergency medicine, due to the
urgency and criticality of many circumstances, a dialect or language has emerged that is
specific to meeting the communicative needs within this field. With consideration to
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these facts, the following definitions are important to add clarity to the content of the
current study.
Ambulance diversion: A situation in which a hospital has declared that it does not
or will not have the necessary capacity or capability to accept additional patients from
prehospital emergency medical transports. Diversion may be for a specific category or
type of patient (e.g., trauma, neurosurgery, inpatient, ED, no CT capability, etc.) or
global, as may occur with total hospital saturation or an internal disaster. (ACEP, 2002, p.
10).
American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP): The first and largest
professional organization of emergency-medicine physicians within the United States.
Disaster: “A situation in which the number of patients presenting to a medical
facility within a given period exceeds the ability of the hospital to provide care without
external assistance” (Krajewski, Sztajnkrycer, & Baez, 2005, p. 2).
Emergency Department (ED): The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
defined an ED as
any on or off campus [sic] hospital campus [sic] department or facility that meets
one of the following criteria: 1) it is licensed by the state as an emergency room or
department; 2) it is held out to the public (by name, signs, advertising, or other
means) as a place that provides care for emergency medical conditions on a [sic]
urgent basis without requiring a scheduled appointment; or 3) based on a
representative sample of patient visits during the previous year, the department or
facility provides at least one-third [sic] of all its outpatient visits for treating
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emergency conditions on an urgent basis without requiring a scheduled
appointment. (Spigel, 2003, p. 1)
ED overcrowding: There is no one generally accepted definition of ED
overcrowding. Common perspectives from the literature summarize overcrowding as a
situation where the demand for emergency care exceeds the ability of the care providers
and resources of the respective ED. Thus, care cannot be provided to all presenting
patients within a reasonable amount of time, causing an environment for caregivers
within which they are too pressured to provide quality care. Derlet et al. (2001) outlined
the following indicators of ED overcrowding: (a) all ED beds filled more than 6 hours per
day, (b) admitted patients boarded within the ED due to the unavailability of inpatient
beds for more than 6 hours per day, and (c) EDs unable to manage new arrivals and hence
forced to close or divert ambulances to other facilities.
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1985: A
section of the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986, which governs how a
patient may be refused treatment or transferred from one hospital to another while in an
unstable medical condition (as cited in Moy, 2011).
Emergency Support Function # 6: According to the FEMA (2008), “A provision
of the Disaster Relief Plan that supports mass care, emergency assistance, housing, and
human services when local, tribal, and state response and recovery needs exceed their
capabilities” (p. 1).
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): An agency of the U.S. DHS
that is primarily responsible for coordinating disaster-response efforts within the United
States (FEMA, 2004).
Hospital-Incident Command System (HICS): A system developed in 1991 by a
consortium sponsored by the EMS Authority of California to integrate the tenets of the
National Incident Management System into a structured system. This system can be
adapted to scale in order to serve as a foundational management structure for hospital
incident management (Baker, Smiley, & Schoenthal, 2014).
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO): A
private, not-for-profit agency providing accreditation to healthcare organizations (MillerKeane & O’Toole, 2003).
National Incident Management System: According to the FEMA (2016), “A
system developed by the U.S. DHS to provide a standardized systematic approach to
incident management that is designed to provide an integrated comprehensive response”
(p. 1).
National response framework: A guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards
response. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align
key roles and responsibilities across the country, linking all levels of government,
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. It is intended to capture specific
authorities and best practices for managing incidents ranging from serious but purely
local to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters (U.S. DHS, 2008,
p. i).
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Policy stream: Ideas and proposals distributed for discussion in networks
composed of a range of actors, including lobbyists, administrators, academics,
researchers, consultants, bureaucrats, journalists, and other media figures, as well as
congressional staff (Kingdon, 2003).
Policy window: According to Kingdon (2003), “The opportunity to launch
proposals or solutions into the political stream” (p. 166).
Political stream: Driven by three influential forces—the national mood, the
campaigns of special-interest groups, and the ideological leanings of policy makers.
These forces are all highly dynamic in nature. The national mood can change
dramatically at any time, and elections produce change in the ideologies of policy makers
(Kingdon, 2003).
Preparedness: An array of intentional, significant, and decisive tasks and actions
essential to define, construct, build, sustain, and support the operational capabilities of a
hospital to avert, shield against, react, and recover from disaster situations (FEMA,
2004).
Problems: According to Kingdon (2003), “Conditions that [cause] people [to]
become convinced that something should be done to change it [sic]” (p. 104).
Public policy making: According to Kingdon (1989), a set of processes, which
include at least (a) the setting of the agenda, (b) the specifications of alternatives from
which a choice is to be made, (c) an authoritative choice among those specified
alternatives, as in a legislative vote or a presidential decision, and (d) the implementation
of the decision (p. 104).
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Rural: A location outside a suburban area that may be sparsely populated. A rural
area is generally unincorporated; an example would be an agricultural area where homes
are far apart and separated by large parcels of land (McLellan, 1998).
Suburban: An area that is adjacent or surrounding the center of an urban area or
city. The suburban area is often a residential area with single-family homes (McLellan,
1998).
Surge capacity: According to a government report entitled Bioterrorism and
Health System Preparedness (2007), “A healthcare system’s ability to expand quickly to
meet an increased demand for medical care in the event of bioterrorism or other largescale public health emergencies” (p. 2).
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (U.S. DHHS): The principal
agency for protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential human services
(U.S. DHHS, 2008).
Urban: An area characterized as the center of an incorporated community or
municipality with a population of 2,500 or greater (McLellan, 1998).
Assumptions
I am a healthcare professional with many years of experience in the
administration of a variety of hospitals with proven clinical expertise in the specialty of
emergency medicine and trauma within both rural and urban settings. For purposes of the
current study, I made the assumption that EDs are not fully prepared to manage all
hazards. I also assumed that the ED nurse manager or director is the most knowledgeable
individual within the hospital to relate the state of preparedness within their respective
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facility due to the scope and exposure of their roles. Additionally, I assumed that publicpolicy expectations exist for emergency preparedness and that providers of emergency
care are aware of such expectations. This study was also conducted under the assumption
that the participating EDs had the resources, policies, training, and other capabilities in
place to effectively respond to disasters and that the primary providers of emergency care
had confidence in these capabilities.
Scope, Delimitations, and Limitations
The research problem of interest in the current study was the gap between the
expectation of all-hazards preparation and the actual level of preparedness within U.S.
hospitals. The ability of a sample of hospitals to respond to a disaster was assessed. More
specifically, I compared resources such as space, staff, supplies, communication
capabilities, decontamination facilities, flex capacity, and the availability of protective
equipment. Additionally, I explored the research problem from the perspectives of
nursing leaders and their awareness of government expectations, their related education,
and their ability to manage a disaster within their EDs.
The population sample of this study included the nurse leaders (i.e., managers of
Tennessee hospitals) who provide emergency services. This ensured a range between
small, rural, and critical-access hospitals, as well as between major metropolitan and
academic research hospitals. The term all-hazards, when used within the context of
preparedness, implies that a hospital will have the resources and capabilities to manage
all hazards or any type of disaster that could occur within its service area. An example
would be a chemical spill. There may be no chemical plant located within a community;
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however, it may be highly probable that a tractor-trailer truck carrying a toxic pesticide
could travel through the community and become involved in a motor-vehicle collision
releasing hazardous chemicals. Without the appropriate training, antidotes, protective
equipment, and decontamination facilities, the outcome could be fatal to both community
members and hospital staff. However, in times of overcrowding, low reimbursements,
and hospital closures, disaster preparedness is forced to a low priority by more pressing
needs.
Kingdon (2011) specified a window of time when public interest allows a topic to
be moved forward due to a current public agenda that applies to the respective problem.
With disaster preparedness, that window is immediately following an event or disaster.
Each time a disaster of scale occurs, the window opens and advances in preparedness are
accomplished; however, as soon as the community begins to return to normal, that
window closes, and resources dissipate. Disasters are not isolated to any one location.
Although particular locales have higher probabilities of experiencing a disaster, the
expectation of all-hazards preparedness applies to all hospitals that support an ED.
Therefore, the potential to generalize the findings of this research exists. It is therefore
recommended that similar study be conducted in other geographical areas to validate the
findings.
The following limitations were expected in the current study:
1. The research was limited to EDs within the state of Tennessee; hence, the
findings may be subject to some form of undetected bias that is not
representative of all EDs across the United States.
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2. Variability may exist in the background of the designated emergencypreparedness officer at a participating hospital. In some cases, it is a clinical
employee, such as the ED nurse manager, and in other cases, it is a nonclinical
employee such as the director of security.
3. Answers to survey questions generally reflect the comprehension, experience,
and view of the respondents. Varying degrees of knowledge, including lack of
direct knowledge, may lead to distortion of the research problem and
responses that do not accurately represent the true data.
4. The intentional misrepresentation of data provided by respondents cannot be
controlled (e.g., some hospitals may be reluctant to disclose their true state of
preparedness).
Significance of the Study and State of the Field and Theory
The significance of the current study includes the potential for the findings to
demonstrate that, although the standard of hospital disaster preparedness has improved
since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, it is still not fail-proof.
Preparedness, in many cases, still does not meet the expectations outlined in the national
response framework (U.S. DHS, 2008). Unexpected natural or man-made disasters have
become a reality across the United States. In light of this realization, it is of interest to
many stakeholders to know the disaster-management capabilities of hospitals, including
the preparation and resources enabling their effective response to large-scale disasters.
In this study, I compared the expectations outlined in the national response
framework to the reality of compliance within a sample of EDs in the United States. The
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implications of the findings led to recommendations of a minimum standard of
preparedness for public policy and the resources needed to adhere to the
recommendations. The results of this research can benefit healthcare providers and policy
makers, as well as the community at large, as the actual level of disaster-response
capabilities become known. The findings may contribute to the overall state of hospital
emergency preparedness by going beyond simply identifying gaps in capabilities and
available resources. The survey questions were designed to glean the perceptions of
department leaders as to the state of preparedness within their facilities. It is these leaders
who will be expected to deliver care during a disaster. The findings provide valuable
insight into hospital capabilities from the perspectives of the end users.
Practice and Social Change
The significance of the current study to practice is the glaring reality that a
disaster—natural or manmade—can occur at any time within any community. To best
meet the needs of community citizens, a minimum, sustainable standard of preparedness
must be in place that is consistently supported, resourced, reviewed, and updated. A solid
action plan with ready resources will provide a safety net in the form of provider and
community confidence. Attempting to assemble supplies and train staff at the time of a
disaster serve only to increase the inevitable damage and loss of life.
The objective behind this research was to elicit positive social change in the form
of creating increased awareness as Americans are exposed to, and become increasingly
concerned about, manmade or natural disasters. The problem is exemplified with the past
threat of the Ebola virus. The threat, as well as the comprehensive resources required to
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isolate and treat victims, were shared with the American public. The reality was that the
resources needed to screen and isolate even one Ebola patient would stress the
capabilities of most community hospitals. This was a concerning realization when
Americans had complete confidence in community resources to manage such a disaster.
This study contributes to social change by increasing the understanding of the
actual state of preparedness, as well as identifying gaps causing shortfalls when
preparedness is compared with expectations. With this knowledge, recommendations can
be made to develop standards of preparedness that will bridge these gaps; create greater
and more accurate awareness; and support the development of standardized,
comprehensive emergency-preparedness systems. The ideal system will be better
prepared to handle all hazards and large-scale events. This study serves as a tool in
support of the development of public policy enabling an effective and sustainable system
of preparedness.
Summary and Transition
The provided background of the research problem included a snapshot of the
progression of government involvement in disaster/emergency preparedness from 1803 to
date. Following the events of 9/11, voluminous activities surrounding emergency
preparedness ensued including government funding for public-health preparedness. The
relationship to the condition of EDs in the United States has been described in terms of
ED closures, patient boarding, overcrowding, and ambulance diversions. Daily
occurrences within many such facilities increase concern regarding the capability of
hospital EDs to manage disasters. The purpose of this study was to examine the gap
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between effective hospital emergency preparedness and the related awareness and
perceptions of healthcare providers. The findings may spur renewed interest in
emergency-preparedness policy and create opportunities for positive policy change (see
Kingdon, 2011).
Chapter 2 provides a description and summary of past research related to
emergency preparedness. The selected articles and documents were chosen due to their
relationship and pertinence to the research problem and content that could potentially
lead to answering the research questions. The review of literature includes, but is not
limited to, the state of EDs within the United States, hospital emergency preparedness,
ED use and overcrowding, and surge capacity.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
This review of existing literature pertinent to the current topic of study is provided
to build upon the background introduced on hospital emergency preparedness within the
United States. The review addresses the historical evolution of disaster preparedness
within this country (Altevogt, Stroud, Hanson, Hanfling, & Gostin, 2009), the
expectations of regulatory agencies on emergency preparedness (EMTALA of 1985;
Moy, 2011), and funding sources (De-Lorenzo, 2007; Toner et al., 2009). Literature is
also reviewed that addresses recommendations related to ED capabilities and
impediments to accomplishing effective disaster preparedness (see Derlet & Richards,
2000; Duley, 2005). A comprehensive discussion of the theoretical construct forming the
basis for this current study is presented. This discussion leads to evidence of a structural
and systematic process by which EDs can be better prepared for states of disaster such as
acts of terrorism or unforeseen natural disasters.
Literature Search Strategy
The majority of the literature reviewed for this current study related to emergency
preparedness and its various components. In the practice of emergency medical care, as
well as disaster preparedness, multiple components contribute to the state of
preparedness. They include, but are not limited to, the availability of resources, staff
training, procedures, and hospital capacity. Caring for sick or injured individuals is
complex and requires a variety of commonly recognized supplies such as dressings and
medicines; however, foundational basics are also important such as a safe, clean space for
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care that is thermally controlled, private, and well lit. Adequate numbers of appropriately
trained and skilled staff are essential to manage large numbers of patients who are
critically ill or injured.
The largest body of staff who care for patients in a disaster situation at a hospital
are nurses. Contrary to common perceptions external to the healthcare field, a nurse
cannot be placed into any situation or function. Nurses are specialists, and ED nurses are
even more highly specialized, with a set of skills unique to the type of care they deliver
and the environment within which they work. Technology also varies from one specialty
to another. Health care has evolved dramatically and is highly dependent upon
computerized processes to aid with every facet of care from registering patients to
advanced diagnostics. In this review of related literature, I examine publications focused
on topics such as the needed surge capacity to meet the influx of a large number of
patients in a system that is already overcrowded (Adams, 2009; Kelen et al., 2006).
Ambulance diversion to alternative locations is also addressed (JCAHO, 2006b), and
research centered in the need for specialty training and methods for mobilizing additional
staff is reviewed (Bascetta, 2010; Schultz & Stratton, 2007).
Relationships and interoperability between community agencies, such as local
health departments, are topics of discussion throughout existing literature (Braun et al.,
2006). Emphasis is clearly on communication and conducting multiagency drills and
exercises to identify weaknesses and create vital opportunities to correct them during the
planning phase rather than during an actual event. The expectation is that all hospitals
will be prepared at all times for all hazards. As has been exposed within existing
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literature (ACEP, 2006, 2009), this is far from the case in many organizations. Such
preparation is costly, and many hospitals across the country are experiencing financial
constraints, forcing the prioritization of resource allocation. The likely decision is to
direct available resources to the patients at hand, with minimal provision for potentialities
such as emergency preparedness.
Both primary and secondary sources were located for this literature review
through a variety of resources. The online library at Walden University served as the
primary means of gaining access to relevant information related to the topic; however,
local libraries were used as needed. Internet search engines were also accessed; literature
was drawn from PubMed and the following EBSCO databases: Academic Search
Premier, MasterFILE Premier, PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, and MEDLINE.
Keywords used for the literature search in this study included—either individually
or in conjunction—care, communication, community, emergency, disaster, emergency
department, health, hospitals, nurses, nursing, physicians, planning, policy,
preparedness, readiness, response, resources, surge capacity, training, and medicine.
This was followed by a search under additional topics as pertinent areas of interest
emerged. Sources were catalogued by completing an in-depth bibliographical list that
also incorporated secondary searches through the online library at Walden University,
various websites describing EDs within major hospitals throughout Tennessee, and other
publications focused on the area of emergency preparedness.
Hospital Emergency Preparedness
Historically, disaster preparedness has focused on the provision of food, shelter,

37

and financial resources to displaced individuals and repairing damage to the physical
infrastructure following a disaster. However, preparedness is much broader and
dependent upon the availability of resources; the training of responders; the
organizational, regional, and federal infrastructure; and the respective budget or finances
(Bascetta, 2010; De-Lorenzo, 2007; Hsu et al., 2006; Kingdon, 2011; Kiselev, 2010;
Niska & Shimizu, 2011; Toner et al., 2009). Minimal attention has been given to
healthcare needs beyond first aid and field triage. Issues related to expanding hospitalsurge capacity and coordinating healthcare and first-response networks in the aftermath
of disaster were largely perceived as irrelevant within the United States throughout the
majority of the 20th Century. Prior to 2009, the emergency-preparedness standards of the
Joint Commission (2009) related primarily to physical-plant threats such as floods, fire,
and loss of electrical power. Such threats were placed in the same category as safety,
security, and infection control. Preparedness for multiple casualties typically centered on
the response of individual EDs.
During the late 1980s and 1990s, awareness of chemical and biological weapons,
as well as the threat of their use in terrorist attacks, drew concurrent attention to the need
for hospital disaster planning (Toner et al., 2009). Over the same decade, the 1993
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, along with a series of natural disasters including
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and two earthquakes in California (i.e., Loma Prieta in 1989
and Northridge in 1994), further heightened awareness of the critical importance of
hospital emergency preparedness. However, it was not until the attacks on the World
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Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11 that serious inadequacies in the existing
emergency-response system were clearly exposed. Problems with communication, data
management, patient tracking, staffing, supplies, and overcrowding were rampant.
Bellevue Hospital, the premier Level I trauma center in New York, was plagued with
these issues. The New York University Downtown Hospital lost utility services and had
water pressure reduced to dangerous levels (Phillips & Worthington, 2009).
In 2002, the U.S. DHHS established the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP)
with the aim of enhancing the capacity of hospitals and other healthcare systems to
prepare for, and respond to, public-health emergencies, including bioterrorist attacks,
natural disasters, and pandemic influenza (Toner et al., 2009). Top priorities currently
include bolstering the capabilities of hospitals in domains such as interoperable
communication systems, personnel management, bed tracking, fatality-management
planning, and hospital-evaluation planning. Earlier priorities included expanding bed and
staffing surge capacity, decontamination capabilities, isolation capacity, pharmaceutical
supplies, education, and training exercises and drills.
In 2007, the U.S. DHHS commissioned a comprehensive 2-year project
evaluating hospital preparedness from the inception of the HPP in 2002 through mid2007 (as cited in Toner et al., 2009). In addition to assessing the changes through that
period, the findings were applied to the development of tools and strategies for future
evaluation. Toner et al. (2009) presented evaluation data based upon the 2008 descriptive
framework that emerged from their study. This framework is a conceptual model of
preparedness for mass-casualty events, formed by local and regional healthcare systems
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delineating the essential components of hospital disaster preparedness. The evaluation
report was drawn from in-depth interviews with 133 health officials and hospital
clinicians representing 50 states, the largest cities in the nation, and major U.S. territories,
along with analyses of relevant literature, government reports, and HPP program
assessments.
The findings of the U.S. DHHS project indicated significant improvements in the
disaster preparedness of individual hospitals since launch of the HPP (as cited in Toner et
al., 2009). The improvements included more detailed and comprehensive disaster plans;
coordinated efforts with community agencies in some locations; more formal disastertraining protocols; stockpiling of emergency supplies, resources, and equipment; and
more frequent, higher quality drills. One of the most important improvements was the
emergence of healthcare coalitions involving networking and other forms of collaboration
between hospitals, public-health departments, and emergency management and response
officials. One such coalition is the Bethesda Hospital Emergency Partnership Plan
introduced in 2004 (Phillips & Worthington, 2009). This involves three adjacent hospitals
within the Washington, DC area—the National Naval Medical Center; the National
Institutes of Health Clinical Center; and Suburban Hospital, a nonprofit community
facility. The emergency response of hospitals to the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon was
severely inadequate (Toner et al., 2009). The Bethesda Hospital Partnership Plan is
considered a model program and efforts are currently underway to adapt it to other
localities (Phillips & Worthington, 2009).
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The evaluation report commissioned by the U.S. DHHS demonstrated that U.S.
hospital emergency preparedness remains in a preliminary phase with ample room for
improvement (as cited in Toner et al., 2009). The establishment of standards and
protocols for accommodating mass casualties represents an unprecedented departure from
conventional healthcare practices and poses complex clinical, legal, and ethical
challenges. Toner et al. (2009) noted that this daunting task requires leadership and
direction at national, state, and local levels. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) recently
issued guidelines for establishing crisis standards of medical care for implementation
during disaster situations (as cited in Altevogt et al., 2009). The evaluation report
revealed that the most effective metrics for quantifying the degree of hospital
preparedness rely upon clearly defined indicators and were not unduly cumbersome to
implement (Toner et al., 2009). Some of the most useful metrics included numerical
surge capacity and capability targets, staff training, and staff performance during
exercises and real-life events.
The evaluation report commissioned by the U.S. DHHS recommended the use of
JCAHO standards for emergency management in conjunction with the HPP guidelines
because the two publications overlap (as cited in Toner et al., 2009). The JCAHO (2006a)
outlined a preliminary set of standards for emergency-management planning, infection
control, and disaster response in 2006. These standards were subsequently refined and
expanded during 2008 (as cited in Soloff, 2008). The revised emergency-management
standards were derived from 5 years of detailed investigation by JCAHO into the range of
natural and artificial disasters that have affected healthcare organizations, including the
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terrorist attacks of 9/11, hurricanes, floods, and extensive utility outages. Based upon this
research, JCAHO concluded that planning for a single event is deeply inadequate and
healthcare organizations “should be able to demonstrate sufficient flexibility to respond
effectively to combinations of escalating events” (p. 3).
One highly recommended technique for enhancing and maintaining emergency
preparedness is performing a thorough gap analysis as part of the emergencymanagement program of the respective organization (Emergency Preparedness, 2010). A
complete gap analysis includes the following four steps:
1. Identifying planning scenarios including the expected number of casualties for
each scenario.
2. Developing requirements.
3. Charting existing resources and capabilities.
4. Identifying the gap between existing resources and capabilities and the total
requirements needed for each planning scenario, as well as advancing the plan
forward to the next-highest support agency.
Veterans Administration Medical Centers perform gap analyses to bolster their
capabilities in serving veterans and local communities during emergencies.
One of the conclusions of the evaluation report commissioned by the U.S. DHHS
is the need for sustained and increased HPP funding (Toner et al., 2009). Toner et al.
(2009) acknowledged that significant declines in funding levels would likely delay or
hinder progress in hospital preparedness and indefinitely set back the ability of the United
States to effectively manage mass casualties in the aftermath of catastrophic emergencies.

42

These researchers also noted that hospitals are investing their own material resources in
emergency preparedness but cannot be expected to independently build upon and
improve their capabilities without external funding. The critical importance of sustained
funding is continually reiterated throughout related literature (Bascetta, 2010; Cherry &
Trainer, 2008; Is the Medical Community Ready, 2010).
The State of Emergency Medicine
In 2006, the ACEP issued the first national report card on the state of emergency
medicine. The national grade was a C– (ACEP, 2006). Many deficiencies included lack
of resources, particularly a lack of access to resources. Three years later, the 2009 report
card issued the same C– grade (ACEP, 2009). This report was designed to address the
realities of the dual role of EDs as providers of emergency care in crisis situations and the
safety net for individuals with no other point of access to medical care. The report built
upon the 2006 version, drawing data from the most current sources to assess ED care on
five dimensions. Based upon 116 metrics, the following five dimensions were weighted
to obtain a grade for each state and the District of Columbia, as well as the United States
as a whole: (a) access to emergency care (30%), (b) the quality and patient-safety
environment (20%), (c) the medical-liability environment (20%), (d) public health and
injury prevention (15%), and (e) disaster preparedness (15%).
The ACEP (2009) perceived the results of the described 2009 report card as
troubling. The scores of individual states ranged from a B for Massachusetts to a D– for
Arkansas. Of the five categories, the United States earned the lowest score on the most
vital aspect of emergency management—access to care, scoring a dismal D– for this
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category. The overall conclusion is that the needs of a growing and aging U.S. population
far exceed the number of existing hospital EDs. The ACEP task force emphasized that
this dimension of the report card encompasses the most important aspects of emergency
care.
The United States earned a grade of C+ on the dimension of quality and patientsafety environment on the ACEP 2009 report card. The ACEP task force found that the
states varied tremendously on this measure. Notably, states that earned high grades in this
dimension typically had sufficiently funded EMS systems with protocols designed to
provide a quick response during life-threatening conditions. These states also tended to
monitor quality measures, track negative events, and utilize electronic medical records to
a greater degree than other states.
The United States received a C– on the ACEP 2009 report card in the category of
medical-liability environment, another area of wide variability among states. Data
conducive to objective evaluation were difficult to obtain on this measure. The nation
earned a C on public health and injury prevention. The task force noted that preventable
injuries and illnesses remain key contributors to unnecessary morbidity, mortality, and
disability. In spite of empirically sound, cost-efficient strategies for public-health
promotion, the United States lagged behind other developed nations in reducing
morbidity and mortality.
Disaster preparedness was a new dimension for the 2009 edition of the ACEP
report card. It was added to capture the disaster-planning initiatives that were becoming
more tightly woven into the emergency-care system. The United States scored a C+ in
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this category. The task force obtained some of the state-specific data on this dimension
through a comprehensive survey of the states and District of Columbia because the
information was not yet available on a federal level. This dimension targets four major
areas essential to an effective medical-disaster response—state coordination, hospital
capacity, availability of trained staff, and funding. These aspects of disaster preparedness
continue to evolve (Bascetta, 2010; Braun et. al., 2006; Cherry & Trainer, 2008; Toner
et al., 2009).
The ACEP report card confirmed the rampant criticism that federal funding for
disaster preparedness was inadequate (as cited in Cherry & Trainer, 2008). The College
noted that a scant 4% of U.S. DHS funding is devoted to emergency medical-system
preparedness (ACEP, 2009). To compensate, many states have invested heavily in
systems and infrastructures enabling a rapid and effective response to natural or artificial
disasters. High-performing states typically have high per capita federal funding for
disaster response. They also have formal all-hazards medical-response protocols or
Emergency Support Function #8 plans, which are typically shared with EMS and key
hospital personnel. These states have fairly high numbers of nurses and doctors registered
in an emergency system for advanced credentialing of volunteer health professionals,
have created effective communication and notification systems, and hold drills and
training consistent with JCAHO standards (JCAHO, 2006a; Soloff, 2008).
The ACEP (2009) deemed the U.S. grade of C+ a reflection of inadequate funding
for the critical need of frontline medical providers, as well as an absence of consistent
direction by the federal government despite efforts invested in emergency care by many
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states. Based upon their findings, the ACEP presented the following eight
recommendations for improving the state of emergency care:
1. Establish stronger EDs as part of national healthcare reform.
2. Reduce ED boarding and hospital crowding.
3. Pass the Access to EMS Act of 2009.
4. Enact state and federal reforms for medical liability.
5. Channel a greater proportion of federal funding and support into disaster
preparedness focused on emergency medical preparedness and response.
6. Expand support for the U.S. healthcare safety net.
7. Create mechanisms for bolstering the coordination of emergency services.
8. Increase the utilization of systems, standards, and information technology to
monitor and improve the patient-safety environment.
The ACEP concluded that the national emergency healthcare system is in grim condition,
calling upon emergency-care professionals, government officials, and private citizens to
scrutinize the report card of the respective states with the goal of identifying problem
areas and actively supporting endeavors to improve the system.
Emergency Department Overcrowding
One of the top priorities of the JCAHO (2004a) for improving emergency
capabilities is establishing standards for emergency-room care. ED overcrowding
standards were introduced in the Leadership chapter of the 2004 Hospital Accreditation
Manual published by the Commission (JCAHO, 2004b). Tantamount to this factor is the
issue of adequate resources. In the case of emergency preparedness, resources encompass
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far more than medical supplies and extend into appropriate space, equipment, and human
resources such as qualified medical staff. ED overcrowding gained initial attention during
the 1980s and awareness increased over the following decade (ACEP, 2006, 2008, 2009;
Kellerman, 2006). Impediments to alleviating the situation included lack of a clear
definition in terms of what constitutes overcrowding and inadequate understanding of its
causes. Ambulance diversion is a common practice for addressing overcrowded EDs;
however, this is, ultimately, an ineffective solution.
Cherry and Trainer (2008) explicitly posited that EDs serve the dual purpose of
acting as the primary point of access for universal health care and as the critical safety net
for emergency medical care. A report by the IOM (2006) found that the demand for
emergency care escalated by 26% between 1993 and 2003; however, during the same
time period, both the number of EDs and the number of hospital beds declined. Patients
admitted to the hospital were frequently boarded within the ED until an inpatient bed was
available, which was for 48 hours or longer due to hospital-wide overcrowding. In 2003,
ambulances were diverted at an average of once every minute, often resulting in patients
being transferred to facilities with less-than-optimal care for their needs.
The ACEP (2008) task force reported that hospital EDs have not adapted to major
changes that have occurred since the 1990s. With the exception of hospitals that have
undertaken strategic efforts to alleviate crowding, most continue to staff their EDs in the
same way these departments were staffed during the 1960s (i.e., Monday through Friday;
business hours; with limited staffing on evenings, nights, and weekends). This practice is
severely outdated with the present role of the ED, which is to serve as the universal
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access point for medical care. Consequently, this is a key contributing factor to the
problem of ED capacity. The task force also found that, despite having the ability to
predict ED crowding, the majority of hospitals fail to anticipate and prepare for the
probable volume of patient admissions the following day. An antiquated structure is
implicated that perpetuates ED crowding and compromises patient safety and care.
The ACEP (2008) task force outlined several high-impact solutions to address the
conditions that perpetuate ED overcrowding. The first was to move emergency patients
out of the ED to inpatient areas including hallways and conference rooms when
necessary. The second recommended solution was coordinating the discharge of hospital
patients before noon, a practice that has been found to significantly ease patient flow. The
third solution was coordinating schedules for elective-surgery patients. Other potential
solutions include bedside registration of patients, creating “fast track” units, creating
observation units, establishing a physician-triage process, and canceling elective
surgeries. However, each of these potential solutions presents drawbacks such as
additional costs or the potential for the strategy to ease ED overcrowding but result in
impediments to patient flow in other areas of the hospital.
The most effective strategy for easing ED overcrowding actually addresses the
overall issue of emergency care by establishing a coordinated regional system that
operates under national standards (IOM, 2006). The IOM (2006), as well as other
sources, have emphasized that hospitals have been slow to capitalize on information
technologies for managing patient care. Electronic medical records are essential for
ensuring that patients undergoing treatment for cancer or other serious conditions
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continue to receive appropriate treatment during a disaster (Tariman, 2007).
Communication systems are a major weakness in emergency preparedness (IOM, 2006;
JCAHO, 2006b; Soloff, 2008). Poor communication between EDs, EMS, and trauma
centers results in problematic management flow (IOM, 2006). The lack of coordinated
communication networks leaves some EDs severely overcrowded while others are empty.
A shortage of health professionals is implicated as a key factor in ED
overcrowding (ACEP, 2009; Kellerman, 2006). Shortages exist in both ED nurses and
physicians; however, primary care and various specialties also experience shortfalls. The
number of trauma cases increased between 1990 and 2002 while the number of
neurosurgeons declined (IOM, 2006). Kellerman (2006) argued that addressing the
shortages of ED physicians and nurses should be a top priority for government funding.
ED personnel have affirmed the severity of the shortages and the vital importance of
giving precedence to staffing issues. According to the ACEP (2009), one ED physician
declared, “Our hospital emergency departments are feeling the impact of hospital crises,
nursing shortages, and physician shortages that are leading to boarding across the entire
state and affect every hospital from the smallest rural hospital to the largest tertiary
facility” (p. 3). Shortages seem to affect both large and small hospitals.
The IOM (2006) views government funding as essential to improving pediatric
emergency care. Neither EDs nor EMS are equipped to provide adequate care for
pediatric patients. Children account for 27% of ED visits, while only 6% of U.S. EDs are
equipped for pediatric emergencies. This becomes especially critical during disasters
when children are more vulnerable to conditions such as dehydration. Following
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Hurricane Katrina, children were especially susceptible to gastrointestinal problems
(JCAHO, 2006b). Yet, the unique needs of this population have been largely overlooked
in disaster planning.
The annual survey of the American Hospital Association (2010) revealed that, in
2010, the EDs of nearly half of all urban and teaching hospitals were at or over capacity.
The average for all hospitals is 38% capacity. Nearly one quarter (22%) of all hospitals
reported experiencing time on diversion status within the year preceding the survey. The
highest diversion rates were reported for urban (45%) and teaching (38%) hospitals. The
major cause for the ED diversion was an inadequate number of staffed critical-care beds
(42%), followed by ED overcrowding (27%).
On the opposite end of the spectrum, roughly half (49%) of the hospitals surveyed
by the AHA (2010) reported improvements in hospital diversion over the year preceding
the 2010 survey, while only 11% reported higher rates of diversion. Many hospitals
concurrently found it increasingly difficult to maintain on-call physician coverage within
the ED. The IOM (2006) cited this as a serious problem. Half of the hospitals surveyed
pay physicians for on-call ED coverage, and the same proportion reported increased
expenditures in this area (AHA, 2010). A comparable proportion of the responding
hospitals had increased their number of staff physicians, the most common strategy
employed to expand ED coverage.
Emergency care can no longer be viewed as the province of individual EDs. The
general consensus of both government agencies and professional organizations is that a
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coordinated and accountable system of emergency care is necessary. Achieving this
requires federal funding and support.
Early warning systems. Early warning systems are an integral resource
component of a coordinated strategic approach to disaster/emergency response planning.
Hoot and Aronsky (2006) described an early warning system as having two essential
features—a clearly defined crisis period and a mechanism for predicting crises. These
researchers defined a crisis period as a range of time when ambulance diversion is
employed to deal with ED overcrowding. At their medical center, ambulance diversion
was permitted when the situation met one of the following three criteria that was not
expected to abate within 1 hour: (a) all critical-care ED beds are occupied, patients are
waiting in hallways, and at least 10 patients are waiting for care; (b) the acuity level
places an additional number of patients at risk; and (c) all monitored ED beds are full.
Hoot and Aronsky (2006) tested two conceptual models of ED overcrowding that
reliably predicted the described overcrowding 1 hour in advance. One model is the ED
work index, which was derived from the expert opinions of ED staff and aligned with the
perceptions of nurses and physicians regarding crowding. The second model—the
National ED Overcrowding Scale—is a linear-regression model that links five
operational variables with the extent of crowding as appraised by doctors and nurses.
Following their logistical-regression comparison of multiple early warning
systems, Hoot and Aronsky (2006) noted that the extra hour of advance warning allows
hospitals to initiate ambulance diversion with very few false alarms. The advance notice
provides hospital staff and administrators an opportunity to take action before the quality
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of patient care is compromised. Potential courses of action include contacting reserve
personnel, opening auxiliary treatment bays, freeing hospital beds, or deferring care for
low-risk patients. The key advantage is that “administrators can be proactive, rather than
merely reactive, in the face of an overcrowding crisis” (p. 342). Hoot and Aronsky
emphasized that an early warning system is intended to alleviate ED overcrowding in
routine situations and does not address mass-casualty events. Nevertheless, the potential
responses to an early warning alert are applicable to a surge situation within the context
of a coordinated disaster-response network.
Expanding surge capacity. Historically, the study of surge capacity was
primarily the province of military medicine, emergency medicine, and public health
(Adams, 2009). Adams (2009) noted that there remains no conclusive definition of surge
capacity. Using concept analysis, she undertook a literature search using the keyword
surge capacity. A conceptual analysis produced the 4 Ss—staff, “stuff,” structure, and
systems. Staff encompasses personnel, stuff refers to supplies and equipment, structure
denotes the physical facilities, and systems refers to integrated management policy and
processes. The 4 Ss can be considered the defining attributes or characteristics of surge
capacity, based upon their prevalence within that context.
Adams (2009) posited that it may be simpler to define surge capacity in terms of
what it is not rather than what it is. Specifically, surge capacity is not static and does not
represent routine operations or care. Based upon the described conceptual analysis,
Adams defined surge capacity as “the ability to obtain adequate staff, supplies, . . .
equipment, structures and systems to provide sufficient care to meet immediate needs of
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an influx of patients following a large-scale incident or disaster” (p. 1). Adams called for
further study to refine the definition according to the type of event generating the surge
and the perspectives of different stakeholder groups including patients and evacuees. The
more specific the definition of surge capacity, the more conducive it is to facilitate the
establishment of objective measurements.
Hospital care under surge conditions. Kelen et al. (2006) explored the concept
of reverse triage; namely, the identification of hospital patients who could be safely
discharged in order to accommodate a surge of patients with serious acute-care needs
following a mass-casualty event. In the military, reverse triage refers to treating soldiers
with less serious injuries first so they can more rapidly return to battle. Its application to
civilian patient care is unusual but could be a viable option for expanding surge capacity.
The Kelen et al. quantitative research was conducted for the purpose of developing a
classification system for evaluating the suitability of hospital patients as candidates for
early discharge, according to their “risk tolerance of a consequential medical event as a
result of discharge” (p. 1984).
The initial phase of the Kelen et al. (2006) study consisted of the following three
key steps:
1. Conceptualizing the dispositional classification system.
2. Developing operational definitions of consequential medical events and
critical interventions.
3. Calculating risk estimates based upon a multidisciplinary expert panel.
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The expert panel was composed of 27 practicing clinicians (i.e., physicians, nurses, and a
nurse practitioner) and 12 nonclinicians or nonpracticing clinicians representing a broad
array of related disciplines (i.e., disaster management, homeland security, disaster and
military triage, risk management, public health, and hospital administration). The
panelists participated in a warfare-analysis exercise and were asked to develop responses
to questions involving the creation of the disposition classification system. Those with
clinical experience were asked to rate on a scale of 1 through 10 the probability of
withdrawing or withholding a critical intervention and the medical consequences.
The Kelen et al. (2006) panel members unanimously endorsed a five-category
disposition classification system. For patients within the minimum-risk group, the upper
limit for risk tolerance in the event of early discharge was 4%. In the next-lowest risk
category, the upper limit was approximately 12%, followed by 33% for the moderate-risk
category. The upper limit for the high-risk category was 60%, and for very high-risk
patients was between 95% or 100%. The panelists also developed a list of 28 critical
interventions with a probability of resulting in a consequential medical event if
discontinued. The impact of discontinuing the interventions was ranked between 3 and 10
on a 10-point scale. Kelen et al. noted that the level of risk tolerance the panelists derived
for the two lowest risk categories are lower than the actual risk of adverse events for
discharged hospital patients, which has been reported as high as 19% in the first 3 weeks
following discharge. The development of the disposition classification system was the
first stage of the project, which is designed to produce and validate clinical criteria for
making real-time decisions for early discharge in response to a patient surge.
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A task force on mass critical care developed a framework for providing
emergency mass critical care (EMCC) in response to a surge event (Rubinson et al.,
2008). Although the creation of the task force was “triggered” by the potential for a
serious influenza pandemic, the framework can be adapted across crisis situations. The
task force outlined several broad recommendations. They proposed that all hospitals with
an intensive-care unit prepare to provide EMCC in a coordinated effort with regionalhospital planning. The task force strongly advocated for the development of healthcare
coalitions. They also recommended the rigorous application of metrics including the
development of precise benchmarks for mass-casualty surge capacity.
The task force on mass critical care also recommended that hospitals with
intensive-care units plan and prepare for the provision of EMCC on a daily basis during
the response period for a patient population at least triple the typical capacity for an
intensive-care unit (Rubinson et al., 2008). They also suggested that hospitals prepare to
provide EMCC for 10 consecutive days without the need for external medical assistance
and offered suggestions for adapting specific critical-care procedures. The EMCC
framework is consistent with the IOM (2006) standards of care during crisis (Altevogt
et al., 2009).
Disaster-response hospitals. In the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, several
alternate health facilities, ranging from a veterinary hospital to an empty retail store, were
established as surge hospitals (JCAHO, 2006b). The “Katrina Clinic” was set up in
Reliant Arena, next to the Houston Astrodome, by the Harris County Hospital District. It
was operated and staffed in collaboration with medical doctors and faculty from Baylor
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College of Medicine and other medical volunteers from the area. A call for medical
volunteers elicited 2,700 responses. With dedicated staff and donated supplies and
equipment, the facility rapidly expanded, processing more than 10,000 patients over 15
days. Acutely ill patients were sent to local hospitals. Most clinic treatment was for
chronic conditions such as diabetes, high blood pressure, and asthma. Treatment unique
to the situation included the provision of thousands of immunizations and treating
gastrointestinal infections eventually identified as the Norwalk virus. A second clinic
opened at the George R. Brown Convention Center where more than 9,000 additional
patients were processed. Katrina Clinic operated for weeks at a cost of $4.1 million and,
after the clinic closed, it became a Red Cross center for the provision of first aid to
evacuees.
The Dallas Convention Center and the basketball arena and field house at
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge served as additional sites for surge hospitals in
the wake of Hurricane Katrina (JCAHO, 2006b). The convention center was established
as a medical command center by physicians, students, and employees from the University
of Texas Southwestern Medical Center in preparation for evacuees. Staffed entirely by
local medical volunteers, the facility provided urgent and chronic care and treated
patients from hotels and other shelters, in addition to those sheltered at the Dallas
Convention Center. Rinnert (as cited in JCAHO, 2006b), a practicing physician and
assistant professor of emergency medicine at University of Texas, commented that using
a space such as a convention center as a surge hospital had two major advantages—the
space (a) could easily be segmented, as needed; and (b) was air-conditioned throughout.
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The disadvantages were the bare appearance, harsh lighting, and lack of shower facilities.
Overall, however, the convention center was a satisfactory setting for a surge hospital.
The university site was deemed less satisfactory (JCAHO, 2006b). Although the
facility attracted numerous student volunteers, as well as medical staff, the presence of
the surge facility posed a disturbance to student life that was complicated by the concern
over the potential for disease transmission. The primary problem was that, unlike a
convention center or similar facility that is conducive to multiple uses, maintaining
normal university life while providing disaster relief presented two essentially
incompatible functions. The empty department store was the most unlikely venue for a
surge hospital; however, the building had been purchased by Louisiana State University
and was scheduled to be torn down in order to build new clinics for the university
medical center. While the location made the space an excellent site for emergency
management, medical staffing, and supply storage, the facility itself presented numerous
logistical challenges. The largest problem was setting up communication channels in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. According to interviewees, the primary contributor to
successful operation of the facility was the powerful spirit of volunteerism displayed by
the workers and suppliers.
The best setting for a surge facility in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina proved
to be the large-animal hospital at the College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical
Sciences at Texas A&M University (JCAHO, 2006b). The state-of-the-art facility was
equipped for medical purposes and, after the animals were transferred and the facility
sterilized, the site served as a shelter and specialized care center for patients with critical
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medical needs. In a collaborative effort with St. Joseph’s Hospital, the area’s largest
medical facility, representatives from the CDC and Prevention, the FEMA, and the
Public-Health Service, under the direction of a physician from the Texas A&M
University System Health Science Center and Center staff, the facility housed 650
people and served the medical needs of more than 1,000. The effort was organized so that
St. Joseph’s Hospital never extended beyond 80% occupancy, allowing for a high
standard of care.
Zane et al. (2008) examined the use of “shuttered” hospitals—specifically, closed
or former hospitals—as surge facilities in response to a mass-casualty event. A major
advantage of the veterinary hospital was that its infrastructure was designed for medical
needs (JCAHO, 2006b). Zane et al. proposed the use of shuttered, or partially shuttered,
hospitals, noting that, although some communities have contemplated such use, no
feasibility studies had been conducted. The investigators focused on two recently closed,
acute-care hospitals within the Boston area, selected on the basis of the following five
key criteria:
1. The building was safe for occupation.
2. The former hospital had some daytime function and hence maintained its life,
safety, and emergency building systems.
3. The former hospital could halt its current function and be available within 3 to
7 days of a patient surge.
4. The building owners and management were willing to cooperate with the
research project.
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5. The site was in proximity to Boston, allowing the rapid transport of patients
from the most concentrated population areas and the largest hospitals.
A team of experts created a checklist for detailed evaluation of each of the
described potential sites in terms of pertinent services; specifically, emergency medicine,
surgery, patient-care units, nursing, food preparation, security, materials management, a
morgue, utilities, and fire safety (Zane et al., 2008). The team was presented with two
scenarios on which to gauge the suitability of the two facilities. In the first scenario, the
surge facility would accommodate inpatients who were stable or had lower acute-care
needs and who were transferred from an acute-care hospital serving high-risk patients. In
the second scenario, the surge facility would be transformed into an isolation or
quarantine hospital for treating patients who were victims of a biological bioterrorist act
or of pandemic influenza or other infectious disease but who had not been admitted to an
intensive-care unit.
The experts participating in the Zane et al. (2008) study deemed both of the
examined shuttered hospitals feasible sites for a surge facility but cautioned that
responding to a mass-casualty surge would demand a considerable degree of advance
planning and preparation. They stated that collaboration between the planners and state
and local officials required clear delineation of the responsibility for planning the surge
facility and initiating its operation. Zane et al. advanced that the most practical and
efficient strategy for operating a surge hospital is likely to be a satellite facility of a large
community hospital or tertiary medical center. In the absence of a tertiary medical center
or hospital willing to engage in that type of arrangement, Zane et al. suggested that a
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county health department might be a viable partner. These researchers regard staffing the
surge hospital as the most urgent need. Bascetta (2010) noted that the state medical
registries are designed to address the need for healthcare personnel. Zane et al.
acknowledged that their study did not address the costs or reimbursement arrangements
involved in opening and operating shuttered hospitals as surge facilities but added that
this would typically be discussed among the agencies considering the endeavor.
Resources
Community emergency preparedness. Braun et al. (2006) considered strong
relationships between hospitals and the community as pivotal to emergency preparedness.
Traditionally, hospitals isolated from community networks are considered “possibly the
weakest link in emergency responses” (p. 799). To gain insight into the degree of hospital
integration into community planning, Braun et al. conducted a quantitative study to assess
the links between hospitals and their respective communities, as well as the factors
underlying the degree of hospital integration. Data were drawn from a random sample of
575 medical-surgical hospitals. The questionnaire items were derived from a technical
expert panel due to the lack of a predefined model or guidelines for determining factors
relevant to understanding hospital-community relationships.
Braun et al. (2006) assessed four dimensions of hospital integration: (a) the
community and emergency planning process; (b) the community emergency-operations
plan; (c) the established response capability; and (d) the ongoing processes of
surveillance, reporting, and laboratory identification. Considerable variation was evident.
No single professional group nor discipline was consistently entrusted with responsibility
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for hospital preparedness, posing a challenge for community groups attempting to discern
the appropriate hospital liaison. Many of the communities failed to capitalize on key
stakeholders, such as volunteer organizations and local media, and some communities
had no established communication protocols for times of crisis. The absence of
community plans for expanding hospital-surge capacity, in terms of supplies, equipment,
pharmaceuticals, and isolation, was not unusual.
Braun et al. (2006) reported far more variation in preparedness among small, rural
hospitals than in large, urban hospitals. Small facilities were comparable on performance
measures and had a greater amount of support and assistance. Rural communities struggle
to establish response networks and are typically in urgent need of additional government
funding (Is the Medical Community Ready, 2010). The two measures resulting in the
greatest degree of integration were participation in community-wide exercises and drills
(88.2%) and undertaking threat and vulnerability analyses in collaboration with
community responders (82.2%).
A majority of the hospitals participating in the Braun et al. (2006) study had
community plans addressing their potential need for additional equipment and supplies
(57.3%), addressing decontamination-capacity issues (73%), and reflecting a direct link
to the Health Alert Network (54.4%). The establishment of 24-hour, 7 days per week
access to a real voice from the public-health department was the only measure resulting
in less than one half of the participating hospitals (40%). The findings of the Braun et al.
research made a significant contribution to the body of related existing knowledge by
demonstrating that, while progress has been made in creating collaborative community
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response networks, the IOM (2006) vision of a coordinated, regionalized, and
accountable emergency-response system remains rather elusive.
Nurses have historically played a central role in responding to health emergencies
and disasters (Adams, 2009; Gebbie & Qureshi, 2006; Nasrabadi, Naji, Mirzabeigi, &
Dadbahs, 2007). In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, nursing and medical students were
among the volunteers staffing surge hospitals (JCAHO, 2006b). Adams and Canclini
(2008) described a participatory action-research project that emerged from the
involvement of students and faculty from the Texas Christian University Harris College
of Nursing and Health Sciences in caring for survivors of Hurricane Katrina.
Community-health nursing students collaborated with community members to develop a
list of priorities that would form the basis for a community disaster-preparedness healtheducation program.
Adams and Canclini (2008) envisioned the described action-research project that
followed Hurricane Katrina as a model for future programs and applicable to a wide
range of settings and diverse populations. These researchers advocated for collaborative
partnerships between universities and organizations such as local Red Cross chapters,
community emergency-response teams, and public-health departments. Teaching
hospitals, colleges, and universities that educate health professionals are valuable partners
within the realm of emergency-response preparedness. Graduates emerging from related
programs are equipped with knowledge, skills, and competencies required for disaster
preparedness. Awareness of the vital importance of emergency preparedness has led to
the delineation of core competencies for health professionals and other hospital staff
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responding to mass-casualty events (Gebbie & Qureshi, 2006; Hsu et al., 2006; Polivka
et al., 2008).
Emergency resource management. Gas-pipeline failures are rare occurrences;
however, the potential consequences of such events are devastating and include brain
damage and loss of life (Weller, Merry, Warman, & Robinson, 2007). The incident that
motivated a study conducted by Weller et al. (2007) was a construction accident. A
contractor drilled through a pipeline within a hospital in New South Wales, Australia,
setting off oxygen-failure alarms, which resulted in a rush for cylinder oxygen. The nurse
manager was rapidly inundated with calls for oxygen from the wards, which created
disorganized competition for oxygen cylinders between critical-care units. Although no
patients suffered harm, the incident disclosed a number of weaknesses and raised
awareness of the potential for damage in the event of a power failure or other crisis.
As a prelude to the development of formal protocols, such as operating-room
guidelines for responding to critical incidents involving technical malfunctions of
anesthesia equipment, Weller et al. (2007) assessed the responses of 20 anesthetists to a
simulated oxygen-failure event. The participants were informed they would be
anesthetizing an emergency patient (i.e., a young female victim of a motor-vehicle
accident who required 70% oxygen concentration). They could not assume that the
operating room had already been used the same day, they would be assigned an assistant,
and they were instructed to act as they would in a real-life situation. During the
simulation, a whistle sounded, signifying failure of the oxygen pipeline, and the
participants were informed by phone that damage from construction work had cut off the
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oxygen supply to the entire hospital. The surgeon was scheduled to operate for several
hours. After 15 minutes, a second phone call informed the participants that the damage
had been fixed and the oxygen flow was restored.
Following the Weller et al. (2007) simulation, questionnaires were administered
to the participants and interviews were conducted. While noting that all of the
participating anesthetists preserved the immediate safety of the patients, Weller et al.
observed several key areas requiring improvement. The participants failed to conserve the
oxygen supply, which would have serious implications in a real disaster, and used the gas
from the repaired pipeline without a prior check for readiness. Several anesthetists were
aware of the need to conserve oxygen but did not know specific techniques for
effectuating its conservation. Weller et al. noted that the implications of their study go
beyond the specifics of anesthesia management. They advocated for use of a highfidelity, human-patient simulator for evaluating the responses of hospital personnel to a
vast range of critical equipment or infrastructure incidents, targeting common
management errors, and assessing new management protocols. Such simulation exercises
effectively identify areas requiring further education and training, with the overall goal of
improving hospital-wide capacity to effectively respond to critical events.
Personnel
Credentialing volunteers. Fifteen of the 20 states sampled by Bascetta (2010)
within a government accounting office reported building an electronic registry of medical
volunteers. Credentialing patient care providers is a complex process that presents a
major obstacle to the quick expansion of hospital staff (Schultz & Stratton, 2007).
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Hospitals have the task of credentialing clinicians prior to assigning patient-care
privileges and, especially in the case of physicians, the process can take months to
complete. Clinicians not credentialed at a particular facility are not permitted to care for
patients, regardless of whether they are credentialed at nearby hospitals. However, when
a facility has a disaster plan in place and urgent care needs cannot be met, the JCAHO
(2006a) permits a hospital to grant emergency credentialing/disaster privileges to
individual volunteers. For physicians, the minimum requirement is a medical license and
a photo ID, which allows permission for 72 hours of practice. This period can be
extended, if needed, although additional information from the temporarily credentialed
professional is typically required.
The cumbersome credentialing process contributed to staff shortages at several
New York hospitals following the attack of 9/11. The problem was compounded by the
failed communication systems that precluded the hospitals from contacting sources that
could have provided verification of the licenses of medical volunteers (Schultz &
Stratton, 2007). Although there are federally endorsed sources of volunteers, such as the
Medical Reserve Corps, the Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, and the
National Disaster Medical System and its attached Disaster Medical Assistance Teams,
the standards for membership in these organizations are lower than the standards set by
many hospitals. This results in some administrators reluctant to rely upon members.
There are additional sources of medical volunteers; however, Schultz and Stratton (2007)
noted drawbacks with the majority of these organizations. These researchers proposed the
alternative of a hospital-based database of healthcare providers located within the region.
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Each hospital currently creates its own database of physicians, nurses, behavioralhealth professionals, and technical and support staff. The majority of hospitals already
keep this type of information; however, it is typically dispersed across different
departments rather than maintained within a single location. To preserve privacy, the only
information listed is what would be available in a phone directory, with no home address
or state Web site.
Standardized software would render a database simple, cost efficient, and
accessible during any disaster/emergency-response situation. A disadvantage is the
database would be limited solely to clinicians with hospital privileges and would not
include important practitioners such as veterinarians, psychologists, and dentists.
However, there are databases for virtually all professional groups that could be integrated
into a hospital database such as that proposed by Schultz and Stratton (2007). Over time,
emergency-preparedness efforts have generated many promising and innovative ideas. A
particular advantage of the described database is that it would capitalize on the use of
information technology for emergency-response preparedness, which is essential for
building coordinated networks and surmounting the flawed communication that impeded
efficient response in past disaster events.
Psychosocial preparedness. In a disaster, the victims are not the only individuals
to suffer psychological trauma. In the wake of a crisis, law-enforcement agents,
firefighters, emergency medical providers, and medical and nursing staff are all subject to
psychosocial stressors. The sources can widely vary to include exposure to tragic and
disfiguring injuries to victims that may be friends or relatives, personal wellness
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concerns, or worry over loved ones who may be in danger. In high-stress situations,
maintaining the stability of skilled staff during such events, as well as in the aftermath, is
essential to reducing the risk of posttraumatic stress disorder.
Truscott (2009) emphasized that healthcare facilities must incorporate psychosocial
preparedness into pandemic influenza preparedness. Treating patients with infectious
diseases carries the possible risk of care-provider infection, which the clinician could also
transmit to his or her family. Additional concerns include ethical dilemmas involving the
role of a healthcare provider in making difficult triage decisions between a spouse or
parent; stigmatization resulting from possibly spreading a virus; expectations of
maintaining a high level of care when performing unfamiliar activities; potentially
preferential treatment in the administration of vaccines or antiviral drugs; physical
isolation such as individual or group quarantine; escalating demands coupled with
inadequate surge capacity; and the exposure to infection resulting in the death of patients,
colleagues, and relatives, spurring concurrent grief and fear of personal mortality.
Providing psychosocial support to healthcare professionals includes all of the
components of pandemic preparedness along with measures for maintaining a supportive
environment. Such support involves training staff in behavioral-health issues such as
stress management; coping skills; resilience; and dealing with grief, anger, and
exhaustion (Truscott, 2009). Both Truscott (2009) and Poutanen (2010) emphasized the
importance of integrating self-care into pandemic preparedness. Incorporating
nonmedical professionals into a hospital database, as recommended by Schultz and
Stratton (2007), would ensure that hospitals have access to behavioral mental-health
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professionals who can provide psychoeducational interventions for hospital staff dealing
with an infectious-disease pandemic.
Training
Pandemic infectious-disease preparedness. Health professionals involved in
responding to scenarios involving severe acute respiratory syndrome learned lessons they
immediately applied when the H1N1 pandemic emerged. This knowledge was further
honed with a subsequent Ebola outbreak and will continue to evolve as future pandemics
introduce new data. Poutanen (2010) outlined needed components of an effective
preparedness plan, which included a detailed communication plan; preparation for
biosafety; preparation for a surge in laboratory testing; tracking metrics in real time;
maintaining psychosocial support; documenting a formalized preparedness plan; ensuring
the capacity to introduce new tests on short notice; and maximizing the use of bar codes,
interfaces, and electronic reporting.
As in all emergency-preparedness efforts, nurses play a pivotal role in pandemic
preparedness. Hoffman and Nannini (2008) called for advanced-practice nurses to
become involved in planning, surveillance, and reporting in response to pandemic
influenza. Chan and Wong (2007) view public-health nurses as especially well-suited for
educating community members on issues related to personal and environmental hygiene.
They also view nurses educated in infection control as ideal trainers for other health
professionals.
Rust et al. (2009) noted that certain populations are disproportionately affected
during an influenza pandemic; notably, the poor, ethnic and racial minorities, individuals
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with limited English proficiency, those with mental or physical disabilities, the uninsured,
and all residents of underserved communities. These researchers emphasized the
necessity for expanding surge capacity throughout the primary-care safety net in order to
meet the needs of vulnerable populations without overwhelming hospital EDs. The
agencies and organizations comprising this safety net include federally qualified health
centers (e.g., community health centers, public-housing clinics, homeless health centers,
and migrant health centers); rural health clinics; public-health outpatient clinics; local
public-health departments; free clinics and volunteer clinics; and hospital EDs.
Rust et al. (2009) provided several recommendations for bolstering the capability
of the primary-care safety net to prepare for, and respond to, pandemic influenza. The
first step is undertaking a safety needs assessment within all counties and parishes across
the United States. Second, these researchers recommended virtual “stress tests,” utilizing
modeling techniques to assess local safety-net capacity. Increasing such capacity and
building safety-net organizations within communities lacking an existing safety net or
with sufficient capacity are two essential steps. Additional steps include integrating
primary-care safety-net providers into pandemic-influenza plans and resource allocation,
cultivating a culturally representative health and mental-health workforce, hiring and
training culturally and linguistically relevant healthcare workers, developing direct
mechanisms and a logistical infrastructure for delivering pharmaceuticals and other
resources and supplies, creating active programs and partnerships between the primarycare safety net and local health departments, and establishing benchmarks for
preparedness.
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Public health nursing competencies. Hsu et. al. (2006) created a competency
model for training hospital staff in emergency preparedness for application with all
personnel. Numerous sets of emergency-preparedness competencies are described on the
Internet, from hospital staff and public-health workers responding to bioterrorism to the
initial stages of clinician assessment and management (Gebbie & Qureshi, 2006). Polivka
et al. (2008) organized a Delphi panel to develop a set of disaster-preparedness
competencies for public-health nurses expected to be on the front lines in response to a
mass-casualty event.
The IOM (1988) called for general public-health competencies, which were
eventually developed and followed by other competency models such as disasterpreparedness competencies for public-health workers and educational competencies for
registered nurses that were related to mass-casualty events. Polivka et al. (2008) sought to
build upon these models through a three-round Delphi study conducted by e-mail. The
expert panel included public-health nurses, directors of nursing from local health
departments, state nursing leaders, and national nursing-preparedness experts.
The Polivka et al. (2008) panelists identified 25 emergency-preparedness
competencies for public-health nurses. These competencies were categorized according
to the three phases of emergency response—preparedness, response, and recovery.
Preparedness competencies concentrate on personal preparedness—understanding
disaster-preparedness terms, concepts, and roles, as well as personal familiarization with
the disaster plan of the health department, communication equipment, and the role of the
public-health nurse during a mass-casualty event. Response competencies center on rapid
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needs assessment, outbreak investigation and surveillance, public-health triage, risk
communication, and various technical skills. Recovery competencies encompass
debriefing, engagement in disaster-plan modification, and coordinating efforts to
effectively manage the psychosocial and public-health impact of a disaster event.
The emergency-preparedness competencies identified by Polivka et al. (2008) are
applicable for public-health nurses employed within any setting and offer a framework
for structuring education and training. These researchers noted that proper education and
training is essential to empowering public-health nurses with the requisite skills and
competencies. A team from the Ohio Public Health Leadership Institute created a
uniquely blended learning program based upon adult learning principles to help publichealth nurses master identified competencies.
Quality improvement. The realm of emergency preparedness is evolving with
the emergence of new epidemics and a barrage of natural disasters. Lotstein et al. (2008)
noted the widespread use of quality-improvement (QI) techniques within the healthcare
sector, especially in the aftermath of IOM (1988) reports documenting the prevalence of
medical errors and other compromises to safe, quality patient care. Improved safety and
cost effectiveness are two positive outcomes resulting from the improvement of QI
efforts. Some efforts have promoted QI within the realm of public health but with
minimal application to the issue of PHEP. Lotstein et al. developed an innovative
collaborative-learning tool known as Promoting Emergency Preparedness and Readiness
for Pandemic Influenza (i.e., PREPARE for PI).
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The Lotstein et al. (2008) pilot project was conducted with teams of three or four
individuals sent by five state and local health departments that had demonstrated
excellence or were interested in greater learning surrounding QI methods. The teams
were expected to physically attend three meetings or “learning sessions” and
subsequently undertake improvement efforts within their respective agencies (p. w330).
The multifaceted sessions involved presentations by external experts, team planning and
sharing activities, and discussions of QI topics and the PREPARE for PI PHEP
framework. The framework outlines five key preparedness activities that, if effectively
performed, work to achieve the desired outcomes of “minimized morbidity, mortality,
and social disruption in the event of an influenza pandemic” (p. w331). The five
preparedness activities are surveillance, case investigation, command and control, risk
communication, and disease control and treatment.
The Lotstein et al. (2008) QI model consists of four elements—aims and goals,
performance measures, strategies and ideas for change, and adoption of the method and
cycles of the quality model known as the Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA). The PDSA cycles
are based upon the notion that the most effective path toward sustainable improvement is
through multiple incremental and initially small changes, as opposed to the “blanket”
implementation of a complete, predesigned program. Each team participating in the
Lotstein et al. study chose improvement aims within the realm of operationalperformance measures aligned with the priorities of their respective agencies. The teams
subsequently implemented process mapping, which is a basic QI tool for portraying key
inputs, improvement targets, and desired outcomes to create personal process maps of
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their specific goals. They were encouraged to incorporate their improvement efforts into
the daily operations of their agencies.
Lotstein et al. (2008) described 9 months of QI activities performed by the teams
participating in their study. These researchers presented several examples illustrating how
the teams applied the techniques to the areas of command and control, disease control
and treatment, and risk communication. Within the realm of command and control, the
Genesee County Health Department in Michigan was exemplified. Management of this
facility sought to improve the capacity of the organization to rapidly mobilize staff in
response to an emergency. They focused their tests on two performance measures
(a) whether 100% of staff could respond to an alert within 90 minutes (i.e., the process
goal); and (b) how the mode of communication affected performance. In the first e-mail
test, only 50% of nonabsent staff responded within the specified time; 25% did not
respond at all. Changes to the e-mail instructions produced substantial improvements—
83% response within 90 minutes and only 5% not responding. Although the rapid
response rate fell short of the target of 100%, the tests provided baseline data for future
improvements and demonstrated the utility of the PDSA cycle for QI.
The realm of disease control and treatment covers activities such as effectively
promoting community migration, conducting rapid triage, and expanding the surge
capacity of the respective medical system (Lotstein et al., 2008). The Georgia Division of
Public Health devised a triage and decision-support phone line staffed by nurses for the
purpose of advising patients who did not require face-to-face evaluation during a
pandemic. The team effort began with forging a relationship with a local hospital to learn
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more about its strategies for directing a triage line and creating a collaborative effort for
its staffing. PDSA cycles focused on identifying which nurses could most effectively
respond to callers with a wide range of symptoms by testing nurses with different
backgrounds and exposing them to various call scenarios. Public-health nurses filling
front-line positions proved to be the most efficient and capable. The data derived from
the PDSA cycles presented the participating public-health department with realistic
estimates of the staffing and resource requirements that would enable the call line to
effectively manage a large volume of calls. Another advantage was the team successfully
engaged the support of nurses who had initially been skeptical of the triage line.
To illustrate application of the QI model within the realm of risk communication,
Lotstein et al. (2008) exemplified the Baltimore City Health Department that tested the
effectiveness of different messages and modes of communication for a back-to-school
vaccination campaign. Parental input revealed that sending letters home with children
was far more effective than a citywide advertising campaign. Of the total parent sample,
63% brought their children to the vaccination clinics in response to their letters as sources
of information, compared to only 10% who cited the ads as their source of information.
While the health-department team acknowledged that the letter campaign might not be
effective in some emergency situations, they learned how to gauge the effectiveness of
communication techniques. As additional benefits, the team credited PREPARE for PI
with helping the city achieve school-vaccination targets, improve communication with
the public, and improve teamwork within the department.
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PREPARE for PI is a flexible framework with a sound foundation developed from
successful QI initiatives within various health sectors. Lotstein et al. (2008) noted a
degree of initial skepticism from two opposite sides. On one end of the spectrum was
public-health personnel who had never worked in emergency preparedness and were
reluctant to do so until they observed how PREPARE for PI enabled them to improve
high-priority areas and illuminate PHEP processes and outcomes. On the other end of the
spectrum was emergency-preparedness personnel who initially questioned fusing
preparedness activities with routine public-health activities. This population was
ultimately impressed by how effectively PREPARE for PI helped team members gather
high-priority performance data for PHEP activities. Lotstein et al. staunchly advocated
for future efforts to synthesize QI methods into public health. Their cases studies
indicated that the application of QI techniques is highly promising for enhancing
emergency preparedness.
Evaluation methods. Arboleda, Abraham, and Lubitz (2007) opined that the
traditional checklists and questionnaires used as a basis for drawing emergency plans are
inadequate for evaluating emergency preparedness in the case of major natural disasters
or deliberate attacks. Both of these scenarios demand a strong internal infrastructure and
linkages with other systems and community organizations. These researchers presented a
dynamic simulation model for use as a tool for assessing the degree of vulnerability of a
healthcare facility in the face of disaster. Degree of vulnerability is defined as “the impact
created by the disaster event on the operation of the facility in comparison with normal
operations” (p. 303). The focus is on maintaining an adequate flow of resources. The
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model is not designed to pinpoint precise values, such as the level of patients or resources
on a given unit, but rather, to provide trend data on the factors under examination.
The dynamic simulation model developed by Arboleda et al. (2007) is drawn
from an earlier model developed by Barbera and McIntyre that offers a “systematic
approach for a community to use in developing its own medical response capability” (as
cited in Arboleda et al., 2007, p. 303). Encompassing services and activities that are
requisite for the care of incoming patients, the model divides the key service realms into
three categories of prehospital care, medical care, and general emergency response. Each
category is charted in terms of internal capabilities, external systems, types of flow, and
participants. The systems dynamics within healthcare networks is a complex interplay
involving health systems, clinical systems, care delivery, prevention, and epidemiology.
The simulation model includes a number of endogenous variables (e.g., number of beds
available on each unit, available medical staff, medication inventory, average patient
stay, length of shift, and fatigue effects), as well as exogenous variables (e.g., patientarrival rates, EMS, utilities, transportation, and number of walk-ins).
Applying the dynamic simulation model, Arboleda et al. (2007) presented a case
analysis of a large, midwestern community teaching hospital. The scenario was the
impact of an earthquake on the level of facility occupancy and patient flow, with damage
sustained to the water and power supply of the city, as well as to the roads near the
hospital, thereby diminishing these commodities and affecting the flow of patients within
the hospital. Comparisons of the disaster scenario with another scenario in which no
damage was sustained allowed the researchers to calculate and quantify the potential
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effects of a disaster. The analysis focused on potential approaches to alleviating the
resulting problems—both stock and flow related—which could be synthesized to increase
the flow of patients during the first few hours of the disaster response. Arboleda et al.
view the model as a potentially useful tool for aiding hospital administrators as they
devise disaster-preparedness plans.
Collander et al. (2008) conducted a qualitative study of hospital personnel that
demonstrated the effectiveness of practicing for disaster situations in terms of improving
the capability of staff members to perform well in the face of a real disaster. In reality,
few hospitals provide adequate, if any, training for disaster events. Collander et al. noted
the minimal evidence existing on the effectiveness of training strategies such as skillstraining sessions, field exercises, lectures, and “tabletop sessions,” as well as the lack of
definitive guidelines for training healthcare staff in disaster preparedness. These
researchers acknowledged that each individual training modality has strengths and
limitations. To compensate for the drawbacks of implementing a single training method,
a large urban hospital within Washington, DC created a multimodality program known as
Hospital Disaster Life Support for educating and training hospital staff in disaster
preparedness.
Knowledge assessment. The Hospital Disaster Life Support program is based
upon the seven core competencies for training healthcare workers in disaster training,
which were delineated by Hsu et al. (2006). These researchers endeavored to develop an
evidence-based competency model for training healthcare workers. They noted that the
lack of standards and guidelines for training multidisciplinary healthcare staff represented
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a glaring gap between the rhetoric of disaster preparedness and the actual manner in
which such training is performed. To develop their model, Hsu et al. conducted an
extensive literature review, analyzing the findings on existing competencies and training
courses. They subsequently synthesized the information into a set of cross-cutting
competencies and target objectives. They used the term cross-cutting to denote related
but distinct groups of healthcare and hospital staff including first-receiver nurses and
physicians, other first-receiver staff, non–first-receiver nurses and physicians, criticalevent leadership, technical staff, and administrative staff.
A panel of 12 nationally recognized experts—drawn from hospitals, academic
centers, professional organizations, and government agencies—convened for the
modified Hsu et al. (2006) Delphi study. The purpose of the research was to clarify and
refine the designated competencies and target objectives. The process yielded seven core
competencies and 21 terminal objectives. The seven competencies are (a) recognize a
potential critical event and implement initial action, (b) apply the principles of criticalevent management, (c) demonstrate critical-event safety principles, (d) understand the
institutional emergency-operations plan, (e) demonstrate effective critical-event
communications, (f) understand the incident command system and personal role within
that system, and (g) demonstrate the knowledge and skills needed to fulfill that role
during a critical event. Each of the core competencies was matched with a detailed set of
terminal objectives.
Hsu et al. (2006) advanced that an advantage of using a competency model for
structuring disaster-response education and training is that the model details specific
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skills and capabilities and can be flexibly adapted to the training needs of various groups
of hospital personnel. Given the pivotal role of multidisciplinary teamwork in criticalevent preparedness and response, Hsu et al. view a framework based upon cross-cutting
competencies as superior to separate competencies for each population group. From a
theoretical perspective, the competencies are derived from principles common to all
healthcare workers.
Prior to delivering the earlier-described program known as Hospital Disaster Life
Support, Collander et al. (2008) conducted an online pretest to assess participant
knowledge of hospital disaster preparedness via a survey of 23 items drawn from the Hsu
et al. (2006) seven core competencies. The Collander et al. evaluation was based upon 10
courses delivered over a 15-month period. The participants included 40 nurses; 11
doctors; 23 administrators or directors; and 10 other staff members that included
emergency medical technicians, nonclinical support staff, and protective-services staff.
The course was arranged into the following eight units: hospital-incident command
structure, protecting staff and facility, biological mass-casualty incident (MCI),
conventional MCI and hospital response, radiological MCI and hospital response,
chemical MCI and hospital response, pediatric elements of a MCI, and system restoration
and recovery.
The mean score at the onset of the Collander et al. (2008) study was 69.1, with no
significant differences in scores between the various personnel groups. Upon completion
of the course, the mean posttest score was 89.5, which indicated an impressive
improvement. All the study groups demonstrated significant increases. The course
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elicited favorable responses from the participants who viewed the training as relevant,
educational, and well organized. The participants also expressed confidence in their
ability to apply new knowledge. The weakest aspect of the training, according to the
respondent feedback, was the simulated hospital environment. However, Collander et al.
attributed this to a need for certain minor alterations to the original training facility,
adding that, on the basis of the participant feedback, the course should be moved to a
more conducive learning environment. As Hsu et al. (2006) intended, the competency
model proved to be a valuable framework for structuring disaster-preparedness training,
and Collander et al. created an effective, positively perceived program for hospital
personnel.
Bartley, Fisher, and Stella (2007) explored the effectiveness of an instructional
video depicting footage from a disaster drill for educating medical registrars (i.e.,
residents) on a hospital disaster plan. The participating hospital is a large teaching facility
within Victoria, Australia that had successfully combined lectures with disaster drills to
educate senior nursing and medical staff on the disaster plan as part of a hospital-wide QI
initiative. However, the time- and labor-intensive training was considered impractical for
educating successive rotations of junior medical staff because their hectic schedules and
competing demands precluded high rates of attendance. The 15-minute video, entitled
Bombs, Bush-Fires and Big Bungles—are you Ready for the Next big one? was deemed
to be a convenient, effective, and cost-efficient way of delivering training. Footage was
taken from a simulated mass-casualty event created by officers of the local State
Emergency Service. The video depicted a serious train accident after which patients were
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triaged in the ED; given appropriate treatment; and admitted or discharged, as needed.
All facets of disaster planning were detailed including the triage and management of
nondisaster patients. The video was designed to provoke critical thinking among the
viewers as to their roles in a disaster event.
The survey used in the Bartley et al. (2007) research to evaluate senior-staff
training was adapted for a video study. The instrument is composed of 11 questions
assessing factual knowledge of the disaster plan and three questions assessing participant
perceptions of their personal preparedness to play a role in the disaster plan. The survey
questions include generic principles and international standards for disaster management,
as well as knowledge specific to the hospital and local resources. The registrars were
drawn from the specialties of emergency, anesthesia, intensive care, general medical,
general surgical, and orthopedic medicine on the premise that these disciplines hold the
greatest probability of future involvement in a disaster-management situation. A total of
39 registrars completed the survey, which was conducted 2 weeks after they viewed the
video.
The instructional video shown to participants of the Bartley et al. (2007) study
effectively boosted the factual knowledge of the sample in terms of the hospital disaster
plan. Their response to the self-assessment questions indicated that the video successfully
stimulated independent thinking and discussion on disaster planning. Bartley et al. noted
that few participants earned passing scores on the pretest survey. Senior nursing and
medical staff exhibited a low level of knowledge on the disaster plan prior to their
training. The brevity of the video provided ease of use as an instructional tool; however,
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Bartley et al. acknowledged the difficulty of compressing all pertinent details into the 15minute format. Nevertheless, the video engaged participants with limited time and the
group-viewing format successfully prompted ideas and discussion.
Summerhill et al. (2008) deemed it essential to incorporate biodefense and
disaster preparedness into the educational programs of all medical specialties. These
researchers reported that, apart from emergency medicine, few programs include training
in these areas. Yet, in the event of a bioterrorist attack or natural disaster, patients are
likely to present in various medical settings, not solely the ED. Concurring with Weller et
al. (2007), Summerhill et al. view high-fidelity human simulation to be an excellent tool
for preparing health professionals for emergency situations. Their specific focus was the
development of a disaster-preparedness training curriculum to be integrated into internalmedicine education. The pilot study was conducted with all 30 residents attending the
internal-medicine residency program at the Memorial Hospital of Rhode Island and
Warren Alpert Medical School of Brown University. Ten participants from each of the
three years of postgraduate training. A group of 30 residents from the same program who
were never exposed to the disaster-preparedness curriculum served as a control group.
The participants were retested 1-year post-training.
The disaster-preparedness curriculum was composed of four 1-hour didactic
sessions accompanied by a manual and three real-time clinical simulations (Summerhill
et al., 2008). The lectures and manual covered the following six topics: (a) general risk
assessment; (b) specific threats including naturally occurring infectious diseases and
biological, chemical, and radiological attacks; (c) indications for, and proper use of,

82

personal protective equipment; (d) public-health infrastructure and reporting protocols;
(e) the role of physicians in a public-health emergency; and (f) the psychological effects
of disasters. For the 4-hour simulation training, Summerhill et al. (2008) developed the
disaster-preparedness curriculum for their pilot study with scripts depicting three
scenarios—a case of smallpox, inhalational tularemia, and exposure to the toxic chemical
agent known as sarin.
In all three scenarios presented by Summerhill et al. (2008), the participants were
expected to recognize the signs and symptoms, make appropriate diagnoses, and perform
proper procedures. Communication and teamwork skills were practiced and assessed in
all three simulations. All the residents were active participants in one scenario and
observed the other two simulations through a one-way mirror. All were given instructions
and “hands-on” training on personal protective equipment and decontamination
procedures. All the training sessions were videotaped and followed by a debriefing
session led by a faculty member. Review of the taped sessions included constructive
feedback and subjective appraisals.
A total of 22 participants in the Summerhill et al. (2008) pilot study completed an
objective test immediately following the course and 25 completed the 1-year follow-up
test. The course participants significantly outperformed the control group on objective
knowledge at the end of the course, with test scores of 66.8% and 50%, respectively. One
year after the course, however, the mean score of the participants dropped to 55.7%,
which was not significantly higher than the control group. Concurrently, the control
group demonstrated a nonsignificant increase in knowledge based upon their
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postgraduate year. With respect to the simulations, however, the course participants
demonstrated significant improvements in the specific topics addressed by the course.
They also reported improvements in their teamwork skills and their confidence in
carrying out critical-care activities and procedures. Summerhill et al. noted that the
residents had extremely favorable perceptions of the disaster-preparedness course. These
researchers strongly recommended active learning strategies and high-fidelity human
simulation for teaching disaster preparedness.
Well-defined emergency-preparedness systems may have a significant impact on
the success of an incident response. Standardization has long been a focus of systems
such as the National Incident Management System, which is an approach to a
multiagency coordinated response during a disaster. Along the same pattern, and more
specific to hospitals, is the internationally recognized HICS, which evolved from a
multiagency emergency-management plan known as the Incident Command System. This
System was devised by the Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential
Emergencies and has become widely accepted as the hallmark of hospital-incident
management systems. Although the system has been adopted by many U.S. hospitals,
minimal research exists on implementation and success of the model specifically.
Schoenthal (2015) conducted a case study focused on identifying the components
of a successful HICS implementation. Three hospitals within Palo Alto, California
participated in the study. Schoenthal reported that the participating hospitals had a
mature, well-practiced HICS. The article cited an average of 29.6 HICS activations per
year over the preceding 5 years, which were reviewed to identify common factors. An
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extensive review of the after-action reports from a major activation following the crash of
the airliner Asiana was subsequently conducted. The success factors were compared with
the identified factors and revealed that the presence of a fully supported system, with
planning, training, and exercises that coordinate with those of community partners,
supported the hypothesis. This conclusion was reached because the previously identified factors
led to a successful response to a significant incident.
Public Policy Expectations
The largest challenge in expanding surge capacity is the development of altered
standards of care. The IOM (2006) Committee on Guidance for Establishing Standards of
Care for use in Disaster Situations was charged with the task of developing guidelines for
assisting state and local public-health departments and healthcare organizations in
establishing and implementing standards of care in disaster-response situations with
scarce resources (Altevogt et al., 2009). The IOM is a branch of the National Academies
of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine that was commissioned by a Congressional
Charter issued by President Lincoln in 1863. The Institute is responsible for providing the
government, as well as the general public, with evidence by which they can base
informed decisions on the provision of health care. The IOM emphasized that “ethical
norms in medical care do not change during disasters—healthcare [sic] professionals are
always obligated to provide the best care they reasonably can under given circumstances”
(p. 2). The IOM Committee used the term crisis standards of care to denote the level of
health and medical care that could pragmatically be delivered in response to a
catastrophic event.
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The IOM defined crisis standards of care as a substantial change in usual
healthcare operations and the level of care it is possible to deliver, which is made
necessary by a pervasive or catastrophic disaster (as cited in Altevogt et al., 2009, p. 3).
This change in the level of care delivered is justified by specific circumstances and is
formally declared by a state government, recognizing that crisis operations will be in
effect for a sustained period. This formal declaration allows for legal and regulatory
oversight and protections for healthcare workers in allocating and deploying scarce
resources and adopting alternate care-facility operations. To ensure against a compromise
in ethical standards, the components of crisis standards of care are fairness; equitable
processes (i.e., encompassing transparency, consistency, proportionality, and
accountability); community and provider engagement; education; communication; and
the rule of law (i.e., the authority to empower needed and appropriate actions and
interventions in responding to emergencies in order to promote implementation adhering
to laws that support the standards and create suitable incentives). The committee calls
upon the states to devise and implement consistent crisis standards-of-care protocols
within the state and in partnership with bordering states, as well as in collaboration with
public- and private-sector partners.
Theoretical Foundation
Kingdon (2011) advanced that the structure of American political institutions
generally works to encourage a fragmented approach toward governance. This is a
phenomenon that is truly unique to the United States, as espoused by Kingdon. The
healthcare industry, while not a form of national government, is unique in that it is
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governed by certain foundational principles. The theoretical framework for the current
study draws upon the Kingdon research to analyze the problem of deficient ED
preparedness, arrive at solutions, and subsequently restructure the entire governance of
hospitals to implement the solutions. The Kingdon study was therefore reviewed with a
focus on the policy and politics surrounding the effective management of EDs and their
ability to improve their preparedness for incidents of mass disaster.
In the first decade of the 21st century, a succession of events, including terrorist
attacks, natural disasters, threats of pandemic influenza, and extreme temperatures, drew
attention to the need for improvement in healthcare emergency and disaster preparedness.
Following a quantitative study on emergency preparedness, the IOM (2006) strongly
criticized the public-health infrastructure on numerous related measures. These measures
included reliance on outmoded systems, technologies, and procedures; insufficient
training of public-health personnel; absence of real-time surveillance and epidemiological
systems; fragmented and inefficient communication networks; inadequate domestic
preparedness and emergency-response capabilities; and communities lacking access to
vital public-health services (CDC & Prevention, 2008).
The described problems escalated over time before gaining mass public attention
due to the crises generated during the summer of 2005 by Hurricane Katrina and,
subsequently, Hurricane Rita. The JCAHO (2006b) noted that these natural disasters
demonstrated that preparedness at the state and local levels is critical to a successful
response in the immediate aftermath (i.e., 12–48 hours) of such disaster scenarios. The
ongoing need for preparedness was again emphasized by the devastation of Hurricane
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Sandy. The potential for an influenza epidemic also prompted initiatives to expand and
enhance the emergency-response capacity of public health, first response, and community
agencies (Bascetta, 2010; CDC & Prevention, 2008; Hoffman & Nannini, 2008; Levy,
2009; Phillips & Worthington, 2009; Rust et al., 2009). Epidemic preparedness returned
to the forefront when the first Ebola patient presented within the United States and the
country was found woefully unprepared.
The events of terrorism and natural disasters since 2001 have increased awareness
among the American public of these ongoing threats and the consequent need for a strong
and cohesive emergency-health architecture (Katz & Levi, 2008). The U.S. DHS (2008)
created a national-response framework to guide the development of a national all-hazards
emergency-response system. Section #8 of the response framework covers public health
and medical services. Under the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006,
the states are responsible for the creation and integration of emergency-preparedness
plans that are coordinated with regional and local jurisdictions (as cited in Bascetta,
2010). The secretary of the U.S. DHHS is the lead official for all public-health and
medical emergency-response efforts, and the U.S. DHS and U.S. DHHS are charged with
joint responsibility for supporting these efforts. Further assistance is to be provided by the
Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs including coordination
between civilian and military hospitals in response to a mass emergency.
Despite elaborate policy plans, a clear dichotomy exists between federal mandates
for community disaster/emergency preparedness and federal funding for such efforts at
the national, regional, and local levels (Cherry & Trainer, 2008). Hospitals vary
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considerably in the extent they are prepared to handle emergency situations (Braun et al.,
2006). In general, urban hospitals (i.e., those with prior disaster-management experience)
have a greater degree of preparedness. Rural hospitals suffer from staff and resource
shortages, and small and midsized hospitals often have no specific emergencymanagement personnel or related budgets in place (Is the Medical Community Ready,
2010). Exacerbating the problem, many rural areas do not have county police, fire, nor
EMS and are thus highly dependent upon volunteers to carry out emergency-response
activities.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (as cited in Bascetta, 2010)
determined that, to respond to a mass-casualty event, healthcare systems need surge
capability (i.e., the ability to provide adequate care for large numbers of patients with
atypical or uniquely specialized medical needs). The provision of this type of care
demands scarce resources and is administered in venues such as surge hospitals or other
conventional medical settings. After conducting literature reviews and interviews with
experts and professional associations, investigators of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office targeted the following four essential components of emergency
preparedness in the face of a mass-casualty event (as cited in Bascetta, 2010):
1. Expanding hospital capacity including beds, workforce, supplies, and
equipment.
2. Locating and operating alternate sites for the provision of medical care.
3. Registering and credentialing volunteer medical professionals.
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4. Planning alternate standards of care with the goal of saving as many lives as
possible.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (as cited in Bascetta, 2010)
investigated the extent of emergency preparedness within 20 states and found that most
of the states demonstrated substantial progress on the first three essential components of
emergency preparedness; however, only seven states had any plans in place for alternate
standards of care in the event of mass casualties. All 20 states were in the process of
establishing bed-reporting systems and most were working with military and Veterans
Administration hospitals to extend hospital capacity. Eighteen of the states were locating
alternate care facilities and 15 were creating registries of medical volunteers. State
officials disclosed a number of challenges involved in addressing the four components of
emergency preparedness. In this current literature review, I examine issues related to
expanding hospital emergency and disaster preparedness. The review is presented in a
manner that corresponds with the Kingdon (2011) theory of policy development, which
consists of three independent streams—problems, politics, and policy. Related problems
are outlined with an initial historical background of hospital emergency preparedness and
subsequent discussion regarding the state of emergency medicine and ED overcrowding.
The Kingdon (2011) theory contends that the policy process moves in phases.
Progression moves from the initial focus on the problems to the political stream. This is
the process where the potential policy is defined as a worthy target for improvement or
resolution. In the case of emergency-preparedness policy, this process tends to follow an
event or disaster, with progression to decision-making processes where various ideas and
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possible problem resolutions are explored and tested for viability. Recommendations are
discussed within various forums and accepted or rejected based upon anticipated
stakeholder response. At any point in the process, a potential policy may stall for
numerous reasons such as funding, competing priorities, or loss of interest.
Summary and Conclusions
Traditional emergency-response protocols are focused on the capacity of
individual hospitals. Recognition of the need for a comprehensive, nationwide
emergency-response system grew during the 1990s. However, it was not until a
succession of natural and intentional mass-casualty events—most notably, the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina—that efforts to create an emergency-response
infrastructure with federal support for state, regional, and local initiatives were generated
(Bascetta., 2010; Toner et al., 2009). The ACEP (2006, 2009) revealed tremendous
variation in the emergency preparedness of independent states, and the United States
overall barely earned a passing grade. Hospital data drawn by the AHA (2010) indicate
that the EDs of approximately one half of all urban hospitals are strained to capacity.
Concurrently, large urban hospitals are better prepared than small, rural medical facilities
for surge capacity (Braun et al., 2006). A series of reports show wide variation in
preparedness, regardless of whether the unit of analysis is the individual hospital or the
community, region, or state (ACEP, 2006, 2009).
The prevalence of Delphi studies by researchers who called upon expert panels to
identify competencies for emergency preparedness or devise relevant questionnaire items
highlight the relative novelty of the topic of disaster/emergency preparedness. The ACEP
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(2009) contributed to this volume of research. Innovative approaches were explored such
as the use of simulation (Arboleda et al., 2007; Summerhill et al., 2008); using shuttered
hospitals as surge facilities (Zane et al., 2008); and the development of a risk
classification for early patient discharge from hospitals (Kelen et al., 2006). Despite these
research efforts, significant gaps exist between the rhetoric of emergency preparedness
and the extent to which healthcare facilities and state and community agencies are
actually prepared for a disaster event.
Katz and Levi (2008) argued that emergency preparedness should be an integral
element of the discourse on healthcare reform. In this intense and heated debate,
emergency preparedness has been eclipsed by issues to which the public have an
emotional attachment such as costs, insurance, and Medicare ironically, the same issues
that dominated health care when Kingdon (1995) conducted his original study. It is
possible that the policy window for moving emergency preparedness to the forefront has
closed with the lapse of time since Hurricane Katrina. On the other hand, emergency
preparedness spans two important issues—healthcare reform and national security which
provides leverage to supporters working to generate attention and action. The design of
the current study is described along with the research methodology. The origin and
characteristics of the data-collection tool are provided. As is the rationale behind the
study population and sample size. The planned methods for collecting, organizing, and
analyzing data are described.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the methods applied in the research. The study
design, instrumentation, target and sample population, sampling procedures, and data-
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collection and data-analysis procedures are described in detail. The data collected are
analyzed with the goal of providing a clearer understanding of the requirements and
current state of hospital-emergency preparedness, as well as to increase recognition of the
challenges encountered by U.S. hospitals as they work to sustain preparedness.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Overview
The purpose of the current quantitative research was to examine the gap between
effective hospital emergency preparedness and the related awareness and perceptions of
healthcare providers. Toward this end, I examined emergency-preparedness policy,
expectations, and availability; the adequacy of facilities and resources including
education and training; and perceptions of emergency risk. The hypotheses formed for
each of the three research questions assisted in explaining whether regional hospitals,
such as the acute-care institutions within the state of Tennessee, meet the requirements or
standards of emergency preparedness. The findings revealed how widely such
preparedness varies among hospitals, as does the level of core-provider awareness of
expectations surrounding emergency preparedness.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The following research questions and corresponding hypotheses guided this
study:
1. How do perceptions of resource, training, and budgetary problems relate to
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee?
Null Hypothesis 1 states that hospital EDs within the state of Tennessee are
not prepared to manage mass disaster incidents. Alternative Hypothesis 1
states that hospital EDs within the state of Tennessee are prepared to manage
mass disaster incidents.
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2. How do perceptions of federal, state, and hospital policy and plans relate to
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee?
Null Hypothesis 2 states that first-line ED managers do not possess sufficient
knowledge and awareness of emergency preparedness and related publicpolicy expectations. Alternative Hypothesis 2 states that first-line ED
managers possess sufficient knowledge and awareness of emergency
preparedness and related public-policy expectations.
3. How do perceptions of external and internal organizational politics relate to
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee?
Null Hypothesis 3 states that first-line ED care providers do not have positive
perceptions of the available resources, capabilities, and training within their
hospitals to manage a mass disaster. Alternative Hypothesis 3 states that firstline ED care providers have positive perceptions of the available resources,
capabilities, and training within their hospitals to manage a mass disaster.
The research questions were answered using a quantitative approach. Quantitative
methodology was the most beneficial for this study because the data compared were
finite and represented information and specific factors related to emergency preparedness
including, but not limited to, the understanding of requirements, resource availability, and
training adequacy. A published questionnaire was used as the foundation for creating the
survey tool. The instrument facilitated access to quantitative data related to the actual
preparedness and awareness of the national response framework. Additional closed-ended
questions resulted in a clearer understanding of the perceptions
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of care providers in terms of emergency preparedness (see Appendix A).
The dependent variable in the current study was emergency preparedness. The
first independent variables comprised the problems stream in relation to the application of
Kingdon’s theoretical framework (2003) and refer to resources, training, infrastructure,
and budget, as well as recent mass-casualty events. The second independent variable was
the policy stream, which relates to knowledge of federal policy, state, and local policy;
the development of hospital policy; and the availability of disaster plans. The third
independent variable was the politics stream, which refers to media relations, notable
leadership actions, and recent mass-casualty events. Another independent variable was
hospital location, in terms of urban, suburban, or rural, in order to further define the
participating medical facilities. The research was cross-cultural in nature through the
selection of multiple hospitals within various geographical areas.
Research Design and Rationale
As noted earlier, the approach for this study was based upon a quantitative model. A
cross-sectional, nonexperimental research design facilitated the examination of
emergency preparedness within multiple acute-care hospitals across the state of
Tennessee. This design is a snapshot of outcome and response as well as of exposed
predictor variables among a population. Data collection was effectuated via an online
questionnaire using industry-recognized technology. The survey instrument was
composed of 73 closed-ended questions intended to gather data on variables pertaining to
emergency preparedness. Emergency preparedness, as the outcome, was assessed at
different levels of exposure, including perception, training, education, resources, and
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facilities (see Appendix A). This design was efficient, given that follow-up is
unnecessary in the assessment and causality was not assumed (see Holmes, 2009).
The primary components of quantitative research provide a focused perspective
related to each theme at the foundation of the respective study. In the current research,
the data collected reflected the means by which participants perceived certain actions of,
and attitudes toward, hospital preparedness. A cross-sectional design, also termed survey
design, is commonly used in behavioral-sciences study when data are collected at a single
point in time from a representative subset of a larger population (Babbie, 2007; Fowler,
2009). A survey method is effective in describing and establishing a relationship between
the variables at the time a survey is administered (Babbie, 2007).
The benefit of using a cross-sectional design is that it allows the development of
pertinent information without a prolonged collection period. This was the aim in the
current study, accomplished by establishing a relationship between awareness of
preparedness expectations, actual levels of preparedness, and provider perceptions. With
this goal, a cross-sectional design with a self-administered online survey was indicated.
Self-administered surveys are now commonly completed online because they generally
result in an increased rate of participation due to the decreased burden of time placed
upon respondents. Cost is a primary consideration and online surveys minimize
researcher expense while increasing the likelihood of a sufficient rate of participation.
Generalization of the results in this study to the targeted population, namely, EDs
in the United States, was a consideration. Validity was established with a homogeneous
group. The characteristics of the expected study group in this research (i.e., ED managers
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within hospitals across the state of Tennessee) vary little from ED managers within other
regions of the United States. Knowledge, response capabilities, and ED operations run
parallel.
Setting and Sample
Criteria for participation in the current study included affiliation with an acutecare hospital. This description fit approximately 4,000 hospitals within the United States
(ACEP, 2002), which would have resulted in a prohibitive sample size due to time and
cost restrictions. Consequently, and to avoid a sampling error, the sample frame for the
study was a representative subset of the target population, which consisted of ED
managers of all acute-care hospitals within the state of Tennessee (see McNabb, 2002). A
list of potential hospital participants was derived from the Tennessee Hospital Guide
(2016). As noted earlier, participants were employed as hospital ED managers or
directors for a minimum of 1 year at the onset of the study and had a fluent command of
the English language. ED managers of all acute-care hospitals within the state of
Tennessee were asked to participate in the research.
A questionnaire was e-mailed to potential participants, which tends to have a
lower response rate than surveys administered on a one-on-one basis (see McNabb,
2002). Due to the statistically poor response rate, the targeted sample size for this study
was adjusted for a 25% attrition rate, implying a response rate of 75%. By adjusting for
this attrition, the response rate was expected to provide adequate power to support the
needed rigor. With a sufficient sample size, the data were expected to reveal common
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themes, enabling me to either prove or disprove the study hypotheses (see Leedy &
Ormond, 2010).
Determining the appropriate sample sizes and power estimations for survey
studies with cross-sectional, nonexperimental research designs presents many challenges,
particularly when the condition is very rare or is influenced by geographic clustering.
Estimates of sample size with prevalence or cross-sectional studies is a function of
expected prevalence and precision for a given level of confidence, which is indicated by
the z statistic. Consequently, selection of the appropriate values for these variables is not
always straightforward, but rather, based upon assumptions including effect size (i.e.,
delta), standard deviation, statistical power, and Type I error tolerance as sampling
variability (i.e., random error).
With a simple linear regression model in testing the hypotheses on disaster
preparedness and problems, policy, and politics, the following parameters were used: (a)
Type I error tolerance of 1% (99% confidence interval [CI]), rejecting a true null
hypothesis; (b) statistical power of 80.7% (1-beta)—the Type II error tolerance—
implying failure to reject a true null hypothesis; and (c) effect size of 0.2% (20%; sample
size of 42). To determine the adequate sample size in assessing the difference in the t
value and F variance in the multiple regression model, the following parameters were
used: (a) Type I error tolerance of 1% (99% CI), rejecting a true null hypothesis; (b)
statistical power of 80% (1-beta)—the Type II error tolerance—implying the failure to
reject a true null hypothesis; and (c) effect size of 0.2 (20%; a sample size of 59).
Situations exist wherein these assumptions are not met, presenting specific challenges
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with respect to external validity or generalizability of the study findings. These situations
include, but are not limited to, smaller population sizes in relation to the sample sizes,
sampling technique, or missing data. In this research, the estimated sample size was
based upon the study hypotheses derived from the research questions.
Research Question 1 was as follows: How do perceptions of resource, training,
and budgetary problems relate to the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of
Tennessee? Null Hypothesis 1 stated that hospital EDs within the State of Tennessee are
not prepared to manage mass disaster incidents. Alternative Hypothesis 1 stated that
hospital EDs within the State of Tennessee are prepared to manage mass disaster
incidents.
To determine adequate sample size, the hypotheses correlating to Research
Question 1 were tested, and the effect size was 0.2 (20%), Type I error tolerance was 1%,
and Type II error tolerance was 0.20, which collectively imply 80% power. With these
parameters, coupled with a response rate of 75% (i.e., a 25% attrition or nonresponse
rate), the sample size to determine a statistically significant difference in knowledge
surrounding disaster preparedness, if such knowledge existed among the respondents,
was 108 participants (see Figure 1). However, assuming a delta of 0.2 (20%) with the
same attrition rate (25%), the sample size required to determine the difference in
knowledge of disaster preparedness among the study sample of the study, with a Wald
Test comparing one proportion to a reference value, was 59 participants (see Figure 2).
Research Question 2 was as follows: How do perceptions of federal, state, and hospital
policy and plans relate to the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of
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Tennessee? Null Hypothesis 2 stated that first-line ED managers do not possess sufficient
knowledge and awareness of emergency preparedness and related public-policy
expectations. Alternative Hypothesis 2 stated that first-line ED managers possess
sufficient knowledge and awareness of emergency preparedness and related public-policy
expectations.
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Power 1 proportion 0.50-0.65, test (Wald) continuity
Performing iteration
Estimated sample size for a one-sample proportion test
Wald z test
H0: p = p0 versus Ha: p! = p0
Study parameters:
alpha = .0500
power = 0.8000
delta = 0.1500
p0 = 0.5000
pa = 0.6500
Estimated sample size:
N = 86
Disp 0.25*86
21.5

Figure 1. Illustration of sample-size estimation. Estimate found by comparing one
proportion to the reference value found with a Wald test (i.e., effect size: δ = 0.15). While
the estimated sample size utilized individual ID effect size of 0.15, the multivariable
model with three IDs compensated for multiple comparison with an additional sample of
22 participants.
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Estimated sample size for a one-sample proportion test
Wald z test
H0: p = p0 versus Ha: p!= p0
Study parameters:
alpha = .0500
power = 0.8000
delta = 0.2000
p0 = 0.5000
pa = 0.7000
Estimated sample size:
N = 47
Disp 0.25*47
11.75

Figure 2. Illustration of sample-size estimation. The sample size estimation is illustrated
by comparing one proportion to the reference value found with a Wald test (i.e., effect
size δ: = 0.20).
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To determine adequate sample size, the independent variables, namely problem,
policy, and politics related to disaster/emergency preparedness and the dependent
variable mainly disaster and emergency preparedness were assessed the effect size was
0.2 (20%), Type I error tolerance was 1%, and Type II error tolerance was 0.20, which
collectively imply 80% power. With these parameters, coupled with a response rate of
75% (i.e., a 25% attrition or nonresponse rate), the sample size to determine a statistically
significant difference in knowledge surrounding disaster preparedness, if such knowledge
existed among the respondents, is 108 participants (see Figure 1). However, assuming a
delta of 0.15 (15%) with the same attrition rate (25%), the sample size required to
determine the difference in knowledge of disaster preparedness among the study sample
of the proposed research, with a Wald Test comparing one proportion to a reference
value, was 59 participants (see Figure 2). Since the overall assessment involved multiple
in the multivariable linear regression model with the three IVs, the attrition rate
compensation of 12 participants was applied to the sample size, implying n=47+12=59.
Research Question 3 asked, “How do perceptions of external and internal
organizational politics relate to the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of
Tennessee?” Null Hypothesis 3 stated that first-line ED care providers do not have
positive perceptions of the available resources, capabilities, and training within their
hospitals to manage a mass disaster. Alternative Hypothesis 3 stated that first-line ED
care providers have positive perceptions of the available resources, capabilities, and
training within their hospitals to manage a mass disaster.
To determine adequate sample size, the hypotheses correlating to Research
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Question 3 were tested; the effect size was 0.2 (20%), Type I error tolerance was 1%, and
Type II error tolerance was 0.20, which collectively imply 80% power. With these
parameters, coupled with a response rate of 75% (i.e., a 25% attrition or nonresponse
rate), the sample size to determine a statistically significant difference in knowledge
surrounding disaster preparedness, if such knowledge exists among the respondents, is
108 participants (see Figure 1). However, assuming a delta of 0.15 (15%) with the same
attrition rate (25%), the sample size required to determine the difference in knowledge of
disaster preparedness among the study sample of the proposed research, with a Wald Test
comparing one proportion to a reference value, is 59 participants (see Figure 2).
Instrumentation
The Disaster Preparedness: Acute Care Hospital Survey administered in the
current study was adapted to fit the particular scope of the research. Permission was
granted directly from the author of the original tool (Kaji, Langford, & Lewis, 2008; see
Appendix B). Survey items related to perceptions of emergency preparedness were
pretested following development. The instrument is composed of 73 questions, each of
which was formulated to correlate with a research question and presented with a Likerttype scale allowing respondents to select their nearest answers (see Table 1 & Appendix
A). An estimated 66% of the questions in the original survey had been validated. Items
related to perception were developed to complement prevalidated questions on other
aspects of the survey. The majority of the variables in the current study will be measured
on a nominal scale with a range of 1 to 10.
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Data Collection
Upon acceptance of the proposal for this study and permission from the Walden
University Dissertation Committee, an e-mail was sent to introduce me as the researcher
to the primary contacts within the selected hospitals. These contacts are the Chief
Nursing Officers of the organizations. The e-mail included a request that the surveys and
related survey participation information be forwarded to all ED nurse managers or ED
nurse leaders within their organizations. The list of acute-care hospitals was obtained
from the Tennessee Hospital Guide (2016). The cover letter of the e-mailed packet also
described the purpose of the study, estimated time to complete study (30-minutes), and a
consent form was included. A link was provided to the online survey.
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Table 1
Alignment Between Research Questions and Survey Questions
Survey
questions

Research
question(s)
1, 2, 3

Variable type
Dependent variable:
Emergency preparedness

Variables
Resource assessment
Training assessment
Infrastructure assessment
Budget assessment

Independent variable:
Problems stream

Resources

6, 8, 10, 11, 15,
16, 20, 22, 24,
27, 34, 37, 38,
39, 42, 43, 44,
46, 47, 48, 49,
51, 52, 53, 54,
55, 57, 61, 66,
67, 68,
69

1

Training

4, 28, 40,
41, 56

1

Infrastructure

23, 30, 58,
59, 60, 64,
65

1

Budget

45, 46

1

Knowledge of federal policy
Knowledge of state and local
policy
Development of hospital policy
Plans available

5, 26
17

2
2

9
19, 21, 25, 29,
31, 35,
63

2
2

Influence of events
Media relations
Notable leadership actions
Recent mass-casualty event

50
23
62
70

3
3
3
3

Independent variable:
Policy stream

Independent variable:
Politics stream
(Kingdon, 2011)

12
13
18
30, 32
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Mailed surveys can result in a particularly low response rate (Dillman, Smyth, &
Christian, 2009). In this study, to increase the rate of response, a strategic set of
reminders were distributed. Three weeks following the initial e-mail, a second
distribution of the survey was sent to the primary contacts expressing thanks for those
who had already submitted the surveys and requesting completion from those yet to
submit the instrument. This second mailing included a brief, friendly cover letter again
requesting participation and return of the survey and repeating the link to the online
survey. The data-collection phase of the study was terminated 2 weeks following this
second mailing.
In the preliminary questionnaire, Survey Questions 18, 29, 30, 36, 47, and 48
addressed the dependent variable of disaster preparedness. The independent variables of
problems, policy, and politics were also represented within the survey questions.
Questions 45, 55, 56, 64, and 65 relate to the independent variable of problems.
Questions 19, 60, 63, and 26 relate to the independent variable of policy, while Survey
Questions 26, 50, and 62 address the independent variable of politics.
To control for potential discrete or categorical variable, this model was
applicable: Disaster preparedness = Constant (β0) + β1 (problem) + β2 (policy) +
β3(politics) + β4 (sex) + β5(age) + β6(education) + β7 (Healthcare system location) + error.
However, if the main independent variable remained insignificant, it was not included in
the final model as applicable to problem related to disaster and emergency preparedness
as a predictor of disaster and emergency preparedness.
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Data Analysis
The primary purpose of the statistical analysis is to quantify variation in the
research data, which may derive from a natural phenomenon (i.e., biologic and social
variability) or measurement or observation error. This process commences with
descriptive statistics, termed exploratory analysis or summary statistics, and terminates
with inferential statistics, implying estimation, a Confidence Interval (CI) method, and
hypothesis testing. The basic rationale for hypothesis testing with either a critical or p
value method is to generalize the findings from the sample data (i.e., statistics) to the
target population (i.e., the parameter). In effect, the inferential statistics with hypothesis
testing utilizes the null and alternative hypotheses in the process of inference. The p value
is used as evidence against the null hypothesis, given the preset Type I error tolerance
level, usually .05 (5%) in univariable mode, or the Bonferroni method for multiple
comparison, as well as a .01 (1%) Type 1 error tolerance multivariable analysis or model
(Holmes & Opara, 2014; McNabb, 2002).
Descriptive Statistics
The survey responses in this research were analyzed with a qualitative scale of
response measurement, implying dichotomous questions for gender (A = Male, B =
Female), and categorical questions for age-group (A = 21–30, B = 31–40, C = 41–50, D =
51–60, E = 61–70). Additionally, a Likert/ordinal scale (A = strongly disagree, B =
disagree, C = neutral, D = agree, E = strongly agree) and a binary scale (A = yes, B = no)
was used to measure knowledge of organizational policy and disaster preparedness.
Because none of the variables in the survey instrument were measured on a quantitative
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scale, the data in this study do not assume the shape and dispersion in the probability
distribution. Consequently, frequency and percentages as proportion were used to
describe or summarize the data (Holmes & Opara, 2014). With this exploratory analysis,
the inferential statistics that fit these data did not assume normality or equality of
variance, as required in parametric testing, but will be based on z distribution (i.e., test of
proportion), as an approximation of a standard normal curve (i.e., the standardized
normal).
Inferential Statistics
Hypothesis testing. There is no assumption of linearity or linear relationship
between the response and independent variables of this study. The relationship,
independence, or association between the intendent and response variables were
examined using the chi-square statistic, comparing the observed to the expected
frequency counts or coefficient matrix that assumes linearity and normality, depending
upon the test.
Correlation coefficient and chi-square. The correlation-coefficient analysis was
used to assess the relationship between the independent variable statistics (McNabb,
2002). Because there was no normality assumption, the Spearman correlation-coefficient
analysis, which is a nonparametric model, was used. This analysis generates the
correlation-covariance matrix for the Spearman Rho and the significance level, adjusting
multiple comparisons with the Bonferroni correction (Holmes & Opara, 2014).
The Spearman correlation coefficient is comparable to the parametric model of
Pearson, where the null hypothesis is the correlation coefficient r = 0.0, implying there is
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no correlation between the independent and dependent variables in the coefficient matrix.
The null hypothesis is rejected if p is < .05, implying strong evidence against this
hypothesis. A correlation of 0.1–0.3, 0.4–0.7, and 0.8–1.0 is indicative of a direct and
positive mild, moderate, and strong correlation, respectively. A moderate correlation such
as 0.5 is indicative of collinearity and suggests removal of such independent variables
from the model for regression (Field, 2009).
Chi-square statistics, although not necessarily required, are used to examine the
association or independence between the dependent and independent variables in the
described context, and validation was performed through Spearman correlationcoefficient analysis. The chi-square model generates the chi-square value, the degree of
freedom, and the probability value for statistically significant independence. Relative to
the Spearman correlation coefficient, the higher the chi-square value, the lower the p
value and likelihood of a statistically significant independence (Holmes & Opara, 2014).
Linear regression (simple and multiple) model. A linear regression model was
used to examine the relationship or association between disaster/emergency preparedness
as a dependent variable (Y), policy expectations (x1), knowledge of disaster-management
policy and plans (x2), organizational policy (x3), and major adverse/traumatic events
(x4). Simply, these models assessed whether or not problem related to emergency or
disaster preparedness, policy and politics could be used to predict disaster or emergency
preparedness in a healthcare system setting. These models are adequate given that the
dependent variable of disaster preparedness is measured on a continuous scale while the
independent variables are measured on mixed scales; namely, continuous ordinal, binary,
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dichotomous, and categorical (Holmes & Opara, 2014). The linear regression for disaster
preparedness is β0 + β1(problem) + β2(policy) + β3(politics).
The aim of applying this multivariable model was to allow simultaneous
examination of the four predictor variables, controlling for age, gender, ED-manager
experience, type of hospital (i.e., private or public), and geographic locale (i.e., county,
city, rural, urban, or metropolitan; Babbie, 2007). This allowed for an adjusted
association through noncausal assessment (i.e., cross-sectional design) of the state of
emergency preparedness within EDs across Tennessee. Therefore, due to the potential for
confounding, the final model is Disaster Preparedness = β0 + β1(Problem) + β2(policy) +
β3(Politics) + (confounding variables). Where β0 is the constant, the intercept on the y
axis and β1, β2, and β3 are the slopes representing problem, policy, and politics,
respectively. These are the functions or exposure effects of disaster preparedness and
balance or control for age, gender, and geographic locale (urban vs. rural). Since problem
related to disaster preparedness as a predictor of disaster preparedness was not significant
at the multivariable level analysis without confounding, this variable was excluded as a
predictor of disaster preparedness in the final model that adjusted for the potential
cofounding.
Confidence level. All tests were two-tailed with .05 (5%) as the significance level
for univariable models or analyses. A 99% CI was used for the controlled or adjusted
model (i.e., multivariable). STATA statistical software, Version 15.0, was employed for
the entire analysis.
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Validity and Reliability
Babbie (2007) contended that Web-based surveys have statistically significant
results that are congruous with other survey methods. No unique challenges or limitations
emerged in this current study to argue against this point. As noted earlier, the Disaster
Preparedness: Acute Care Hospital Survey is a modified version of the Disaster
Preparedness Survey developed by Kaji et al. (2008). With permission, the Kaji et al.
instrument was modified by adding questions designed to gain respondent perspectives
on the level of preparedness within their respective hospitals, as well as their awareness
of public-policy expectations related to emergency preparedness (see Appendix B). The
content of the original Kaji et al. survey items was minimally altered to fit Likert-type
ranking and eliminate regionally specific terminology.
The target population of the current research runs parallel to that of the Kaji et al.
study group. The majority of questions within the modified instrument relate to actuality
or facts that were readily available to respondents within a clinical setting. Questions
related to perceptions were presented with a Likert-type response scale. The consistency
of questions within the survey instrument was measured via a Cronbach’s-alpha test,
which has been discussed in detail.
Ethical Procedures
The current research was conducted with strict observance to requirements of the
Walden University Institutional Review Board. The approval number for this study is 0102-18-0110078, which expires December 31, 2019. The ED nurse managers of all acutecare hospitals across the state of Tennessee were invited by e-mail to participate in the
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study. The message included my contact information as the researcher and that of the
dissertation chair and the Walden University Institutional Review Board. Survey
participation was strictly voluntary. There was no disclosure risk of participant
identification, which was assured within the recruitment letter. No individuals nor
agencies involved in the study were identified. All precautions were taken to conduct the
research in a moral and ethical manner, which included anonymity of all participants and
their employing institutions. Any hard copies of the completed study surveys will be
maintained for 5 years following publication of the research within a locked, fireproof
box in my home. Upon conclusion of the 5-year period, the instruments will be destroyed
by shredding or incineration.
Summary
The research design for this study has been described in detail, which is crosssectional and nonexperimental in nature. The purpose of the research was to examine the
gap between effective hospital emergency preparedness and the related awareness and
perceptions of healthcare providers. A comprehensive, pretested, and piloted
questionnaire facilitated data collection related to expectations (i.e., resources/facilities,
education/training, and policy) and perceptions of risk. A quantitative method involving
hypothesis testing was applied in the examination of emergency preparedness with
respect to existing policy and its implementation, resources and facilities, education and
training, and the perception of emergency-preparedness risk.
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Chapter 4: Results
Overview
Researchers have suggested that disaster preparedness is a critical component to
the ability of hospitals to successfully provide the safety net expected by the general
public (Bechtel et al., 2004; Braun et al., 2006; Cherry & Trainer, 2008; Nissa &
Shimizu, 2011). Hospitals, and particularly EDs, are expected to be at a constant state of
readiness 24/7 to render care to victims of any type of hazard. Using commonly identified
tenets of preparedness, I examined awareness of emergency-preparedness policy;
expectations and availability; the adequacy of facilities, resources, education, and
training; and perceptions of emergency risk. I explored these factors through quantitative
measurement to gain knowledge surrounding the disaster preparedness of a sample
representing ED nurse leaders (i.e., directors and managers) within the State of
Tennessee. The purpose of this study was to examine the gap between effective hospital
emergency preparedness and the related awareness and perceptions of healthcare
providers.
Data were collected from ED nurse leaders to determine their awareness of
disaster-preparedness expectations, levels of preparedness, and perceptions of
preparedness. The following research questions guided this study:
1. How do perceptions of resource, training, and budgetary problems relate to
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee?
2. How do perceptions of federal, state, and hospital policy and plans relate to
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee?
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3. How do perceptions of external and internal organizational politics relate to
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee?
The Disaster Preparedness: Acute Care Survey facilitated collection of data appropriate
to answering the research questions.
The study survey was a web-based, self-administered tool. The instrument was
employed to measure emergency preparedness, which was the dependent variable of this
research. The first independent variables comprised the problems stream (i.e., resources,
training, infrastructure, and budget), as well as recent mass-casualty events. Policy stream
was the second independent variable and related to knowledge of federal policy as well as
state and local development of hospital policy and the availability of disaster plans. The
third independent variable was the politics stream, which addressed media relations,
notable leadership actions, and recent mass-casualty events. Another independent
variable was hospital location in terms of urban, suburban, or rural, which added another
factor potentially influencing disaster preparedness.
The Disaster Preparedness: Acute Care Hospital Survey is a slightly modified
version of the Disaster Preparedness Survey developed by Kaji et al. (2008) for Johns
Hopkins under contract with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. The author
of the Disaster Preparedness Survey granted me permission to use the survey tool in this
current study. The tool had been previously tested for reliability and was noted to have a
high degree of internal reliability. Variability in the interrater reliability was also noted.
Items related to perception were developed to complement the prevalidated questions on
other aspects of the survey. Study participants were asked to answer questions pertaining
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to their awareness of policy expectations for disaster preparedness as well as their
perceptions on the level of preparedness they perceived within their organizations.
Data Demographics
The reported data reflect the survey results on hospital and overall healthcaresystem disaster/emergency problems, as well as the policy and politics related to
disaster/emergency preparedness within the state of Tennessee. The findings depict the
study characteristics such as participant demographics; features of the healthcare or
hospital system, including geographic locale; construct validity (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha);
the correlation coefficient; the simple linear prediction of disaster/emergency
preparedness, given (a) the problems, (b) the policy, and (c) politics; and the
multivariable prediction of disaster/emergency preparedness, adjusting for gender, age,
education, and geographic locale of the healthcare or hospital system, as well as publicpolicy cognizance. Table 1 displays the characteristics of the survey participants, which
concurrently portray a cross-sectional nonexperimental, epidemiologic study design
aimed at assessing the predictive effects of disaster/emergency problems, policy, and
politics, as they relate to disaster preparedness within the hospitals and overall healthcare
systems of the state of Tennessee. The table specifically reports participant gender, age,
education, disaster-preparedness experience, geographic locale (i.e., urban vs. rural), and
access to disaster-preparedness resources.
Table 2 demonstrates the frequency and percentages of study participants by
sociodemographic, namely, education, age, and gender. The overall sample is comprised
of 51 participants, 27.4% of whom are male (n = 14, 95% CI, 16.7–41.7) and 72.5% of
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whom are female (n = 51, 95% CI, 58.3–83.3). The age group distribution of the
participants indicated the lowest frequencies for both the youngest respondents (21–30
years, n = 3, 5.9%) and the oldest (61–70 years, n = 6, 11.8%). The highest frequency
was observed in the age group of 41 to 50 (n = 15, 29.4%, 95% CI, 18.3–43.7), followed
by the 31 to 40 age group (n = 14, 27.4%, 95% CI, 16.7–41.7). The highest frequency of
participants was found to be among those with a bachelor’s degree (n = 24, 47.1%, 95%
CI, 33.56–61.1), followed by a master’s degree (n = 21, 41.2%, 95% CI, 28.2–55.5). The
lowest response rate was observed among participants with doctorates (n = 2, 3.9%, 95%
CI, 0.90–15.0).
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Table 2
Characteristics of Survey Participants on Predictors of Disaster/Emergency
Preparedness
Number of
participants
(n = 51)

Variable
Academic degree
Associate
Bachelor’s
Master’s
Doctorate
Age-group
21–30
31–40
41–50
51–60
˃ 60

Percentage
of total

95% CI

4
24
21
2

7.8
47.1
41.2
3.9

2.9–19.7
33.5–61.1
28.2–55.5
0.9–15.0

3
14
15
13
6

5.9
27.4
29.4
25.5
11.8

1.8–17.3
16.7–41.7
18.2–43.7
15.1–39.6
5.2–15.0

14
37

27.5
72.5

16.7–41.7
58.3–83.3

Gender
Male
Female

Note. The 95% CI indicates the 5% margin of error with the lower and upper confidence
limits. CI = confidence interval.
Disaster Preparedness Training
With respect to knowledge of public policy related to emergency preparedness, an
estimated 27 participants reported awareness (52.9%, 95% CI, 38.9–66.5). Table 3
presents the distribution of survey respondents by training, drill-practice frequency, and
disaster-response participation. With regard to specific training in emergency
preparedness, an estimated 38 participants reported acquiring such training from their
affiliated institutions (74.5%, 95% CI, 61.6–84.9). Concerning drill or practice exercise
with multiagency frequency, 31 respondents reported such participation on an annual
basis (60.8%, 95% CI, 46.4–73.5). However, 12 respondents reported never participating
in such drills (23.5%, 95% CI, 13.6–37.5). With respect to disaster-response
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participation, 30 respondents reported such involvement (58.8%, 95% CI, 44.5–71.8),
while 20 indicated no experience with disaster response (39.2%, 95% CI, 26.5–53.6).

Table 3
Characteristics of Survey Participants on Predictors of Policy Awareness Related to
Disaster/Emergency Preparedness
Number of
participants
(n = 51)

Percentage
of total

38
13

74.5
25.5

Knowledge of public policy
Yes
No

27
24

52.9
47.1

38.9–66.5
33.5–61.1

Number of licensed hospital beds
0–10
11–25
26–50
˃ 50

9
20
12
10

17.6
39.2
23.5
19.6

9.2–31.1
26.5–53.6
13.6–37.5
10.6–33.3

Hospital location
Rural
Suburban
Urban

24
13
13

47.1
25.5
27.4

33.5–61.1
15.1–39.6
16.7–41.7

Variable
Specific emergency training
Yes
No

95% CI
60.4–84.9
15.1–39.6

Note. The 95% CI indicates the 5% margin of error with the lower and upper confidence
limits. CI = confidence interval.
Resources
Table 4 illustrates the survey results related to healthcare systems and hospital
resources for disaster preparedness. Regarding the employment of an in-house radiation
safety officer available during a radiological event, 18 participants affirmed the existence
of this position within their affiliated institutions (35.3%, 95% CI, 23.1–49.7), while 23
reported no such position (45.1%, 95% CI, 31.2–59.7). Concerning the availability of
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contamination showers or stalls within the hospital facilitates, 33 participants reported
one to two stalls in their hospital facilities (64.1%, 95% CI, 50.3–76.9). The absence of
negative-pressure rooms was reported by 16 (31.45%) of the participants, while 15
(29.4%) reported 1 to 10 negative-pressure rooms. The remaining 12 participants
reported 11 to 20 negative-pressure rooms. With respect to the number of licensed
hospital beds in the respondents’ employing facilities, the majority of the participants
(n = 20) reported the availability of 51 to 150 licensed beds (56.9%, 95% CI, 26.5–53.6).
The balance of the sample reported 151 to 299 licensed beds (n = 12, 23.5%, 95% CI,
13.6–37.5).
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Table 4
Survey Responses Related to Institutional Resources for Disaster/Emergency
Preparedness

Variable
Negative-pressure isolation rooms
None
1–10
11–20
21
Don’t know
Employee assistance program
Yes
No
Don’t know

Number of
participants
(n = 51)

Percentage
of total

95% CI

16
15
12
6
2

31.4
29.4
23.5
11.8
3.9

19.9–45.7
18.2–43.7
13.6–37.5
5.2–24.3
0.9–15.0

50
–
1

98.0
–

86.6–99.7
–

2.0

0.2–13.4

Mandatory disaster-preparedness
education
Yes
No
Don’t know

30
18
3

58.8
35.3
5.9

44.5–71.8
23.1–49.7
2.0–17.3

Disaster-response participation
Yes
No
Don’t know

30
20
1

58.8
39.2
2.0

44.4–71.8
26.5–53.6
0.2–13.4

Patients treated during latest episode
None
˂5
5–10
˃ 10
Don’t know

9
6
9
15
10

18.4
12.2
18.4
30.6
20.4

9.6–32.2
5.4–25.3
9.6–32.2
19.0–45.3
11.1–41.7

Note. The 95% CI indicates the 5% margin of error with the lower and upper confidence
limits. Dashes represent no data. CI = confidence interval.
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Concerning the geographic locale of the hospitals employing the respondents, in
terms of urban versus rural, and disaster preparedness, the majority of the study
participants reported rural locations (n = 24, 47.1%, 33.5–61.1). Hospitals within
suburban (25.5%, 95% CI, 15.1–39.6) and urban (27.4%, 95% CI, 16.9–41.7) areas were
comparable. Regarding the contact numbers of the Tennessee State Health Department
and the Local County Health Department, there was no difference in the number of
participants acknowledging number availability; 25 affirmed the availability of the
contact numbers (49.0%, 95% CI, 35.2–62.9) and 24 participants negated their
availability (47.1%, 95% CI, 33.5–61.1).
Construct Validity of Variables
Tables C1 through C4 within Appendix C present the dependent variable of
disaster/emergency preparedness with the independent variables of problems, policy, and
politics, the latter of which are also predictors in the linear modeling. Survey responses
related to the dependent variable of disaster preparedness and the three main independent
variables were collected using a response scale of 1 to 10, which was later transformed
into proportion using the central tendency theorem for variable scale transformation.
Responses to six survey questions were combined to comprise the dependent-variable
construct. Similarly, the independent variable, collectively comprised of the related
problems, policy, and politics, follows a similar transformation and construct. These
variables were tested for construct validity using the Cronbach’s alpha.
Table C1 illustrates the number of items comprising the dependent variable, as
well as the item test correlation; average interitem correlation (i.e., covariance); and the
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alpha (See Appendix D). The test scale, which is the mean (i.e., the standardized item for
the average interitem correlation) represents the covariance estimated at 0.67, while the
alpha coefficient or Cronbach’s alpha was 0.92, implying a strong correlation. Table C2
demonstrates the number of items comprising the disaster/emergency problems as the
collective independent variable, as well as the item test correlation; the average interitem
correlation (i.e., covariance); and the alpha. The test scale, which is the mean (i.e., the
standardized item for the average interitem correlation) represents the covariance
estimated at 0.80, while the alpha coefficient or Cronbach’s alpha was 0.95, implying a
strong or high correlation.
Table C3 depicts the number of items comprising disaster/emergency policy as
the collective independent variable, as well as the item test correlation; the average
interitem correlation (i.e., covariance); and the alpha. The test scale, which is the mean
(i.e., the standardized item for the average interitem correlation) represents the covariance
estimated at 0.76, while the alpha coefficient or Cronbach’s alpha was 0.93, implying a
strong correlation. Table C4 indicates the number of items collectively comprising the
disaster/emergency politics as the independent variable, as well as the item test
correlation; average interitem correlation (i.e., covariance); and alpha. The test scale,
which is the mean (i.e., the standardized item for the average interitem correlation)
represents the covariance estimated at 0.43, while the alpha coefficient or Cronbach’s
alpha was 0.69, implying a moderate correlation.
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Correlation Between Disaster/Emergency Preparedness, Problems, Policy, and
Politics
Table C5 illustrates a correlation matrix for the correlation between emergency
preparedness and disaster independent or predictor variables. A direct, positive, and high
or strong correlation exists between disaster/ emergency preparedness as the dependent
variable and the independent variable of disaster/emergency-preparedness problems (r =
0.92, p < .001). Similarly, a direct, positive, and high correlation was observed between
the dependent variable and the independent variable of disaster/emergency-preparedness
policy (r = 0.94, p < .001). Additionally, a direct, positive, and high correlation was
observed between the dependent variable and the independent variable of
disaster/emergency-preparedness politics (r = 0.88, p < .001; see Appendix D, Table C5).
Multiple Linear Relationships
The multiple linear regression model examined simultaneously the three
predictors or explanatory variables such as the problem, policy, and politics in predicting
disaster/emergency preparedness. Confounding variables such as age, sex, education and
geographic location of the healthcare or hospital settings are also shown. Table 5 presents
the multiple linear regression results.
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Table 5
Multiple Linear Predictors of Disaster/Emergency Preparedness in Tennessee Hospitals
Variables
Model

β
0.22

t

Problems

0.20

1.34

Policy

0.41

Politics

0.26

F(df)
41.6(1,37)

SE

aR2
0.91

99% CI

p
˂ .001

0.15

–0.21–0.60

0.19

2.94

0.14

.03–0.79

.01

2.34

0.11

–0.41–0.56

.02

Gender
Male
Female

–
–.09

–
–0.88

–
0.10

–
–0.37–.019

–
0.38

Age-group
21–30
31–40
41–50
51–60
61–70

–
–0.22
–0.43
–0.21
–0.43

–
–1.05
–1.85
–1.00
–1.64

–
0.21
0.23
0.22
0.26

–
–0.81–0.36
–1.05–0.20
–0.80–0.37
–1.15–0.28

–
0.30
.07
0.33
0.11

–
1.71
2.27
0.38

–
0.19
0.20
0.30

–
–0.19–0.84
–.09–1.01
–0.71–0.94

–
.09
.03
0.70

–
0.88
2.22

–
0.12
0.13

–
–0.23–0.44
–.06–0.62

–
.03
0.70

Academic degree
Associate
Bachelor’s
Master’s
Doctorate
Healthcare-system
location
Rural
Suburban
Urban

–
0.33
0.46
0.12

–
0.11
0.28

Note. Adjusted for categorical variables within the model; namely, education, gender,
age, and hospital/healthcare system Tennessee location (i.e., urban, rural, or suburban).
Dashed rows represent no data. β = beta coefficient; t = the predictor value indicative of
the significance; F = the ratio between the variance; df = number of ways sample can
vary; SE = standard error; aR2 = adjusted coefficient of determination, implying the
variation in disaster/emergency preparedness due to the combined effect of the
continuous and categorical independent variables within the model; CI = confidence
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interval; p = probability.
The R2 of 0.91 shows that 91% of the variation in disaster/emergency
preparedness is explained by the model. The overall multiple linear regression equation
was then obtained using only the significant variables at p < .05:
Disaster and emergency preparedness (Y) = -0.22 + 0.26(politics) + 0.41(policy) + 0.46
(Masters) + 0.11 (Suburban) + E.
Basically, for 1 unit change or increase in politics, there was a 0.26 change in
disaster preparedness, while for 1 unit change in policy, there was 0.41 change is disaster
preparedness in the model while controlling for other significant confounding variables.
Model Fitness
The model fitness requires the test for residual besides the regression result such
as slope coefficient, p-values and R2. The model fitness requires the assessment of the
residuals, implying the examination of how poorly the model utilized in the prediction of
disaster /emergency preparedness by policy and politics represents these data. Basically,
residuals represent the leftover of the disaster preparedness dependent variable after
fitting policy and politics and controlling for the potential confounders in the data.
Therefore, the residual explains or indicates the unexplained pattern in the fitted model.
This fitness test enables the assessment of the liner regression assumption as well, such as
normality assumption.
Figure 3, illustrates the standardized normality probability plot, implying
sensitivity to non-normality the lower (tail) and upper end (tail) of the data, indicative of
normality in the spread of the data. Figure 4 demonstrates the plots of the quantiles
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dependent variables and independent variables (politics, policies) against quantiles of a
normal distribution. Relative to figure 3, the standardized normality probability plot, the
quantile plot is indicative of a slight deviation from normal at the lower and upper tail of
the plot. In effect there seems to be a minor and trivial deviation from normality,
implying that the observed residuals are close to a normal distribution, and hence model
fitness.

Figure 3. Standardized normal probability plot for residuals on Disaster Preparedness
dependent (DV) and independent variables (IV) (policy and politics).
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Figure 4. Quantile plot of the DV and IVs against the quantiles of normal distribution.

Summary
The following research questions guided this study:
1. How do perceptions of resource, training, and budgetary problems relate to
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee?
2. How do perceptions of federal, state, and hospital policy and plans relate to
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee?
3. How do perceptions of external and internal organizational politics relate to
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee?
These questions were answered using linear regression modeling with analytics
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performed through STATA statistical software (version 15.0). A significant correlation
was observed, implying that policy and politics could be used to predict disaster
/emergency preparedness in the state of Tennessee. The overall findings with the
independent variables, after accounting for socio-demographics the confounders, indicate
moderate to strong relationships among two predictor independent variables and the
dependent variable. Specifically, policy and politics could be used to predict disaster and
emergency preparedness in the state of Tennessee. The problem IV was not significant.
The findings are indicative of the opportunity to improve basic disaster/emergency
preparedness in TN. The results also indicate a gap between an awareness of public
policy regarding such preparedness and associated expectations. In Chapter 5, the
interpretation of the findings is expanded and the implications for social change are
outlined. Recommendations for action and further study are also provided.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Overview
The purpose of this research was to examine the gap between effective hospital
emergency preparedness and the related awareness and perceptions of healthcare
providers. Specifically, I assessed the exposure effect of the problem and related policy
and politics in disaster preparedness within healthcare systems, including hospital
settings.
In this study, I aimed to examine the implications of the perceived disaster
problem, policy, and politics. A cross-sectional design was used to gather data from
participants in healthcare settings and hospitals in the state of Tennessee. The questions
reflected the participants’ sociodemographic, available resources for disaster
preparedness, as well as the main independent variables, namely problem, policy, and
politics and the dependent variable, namely disaster and emergency preparedness.
I compared federal expectations surrounding hospital preparedness to
expectations drawn from surveys in this study from first line ED caregivers. The analyses
were based upon a multiple linear regression model. The model indicated that there is a
significant relationship among politics and policy variables with disaster/emergency
preparedness. Most importantly, my findings suggest that politics and policies can be
used to predict disaster preparedness in Tennessee hospitals and the state healthcare
system.
In testing the hypotheses of this study, I collected data to determine the gap
between hospital emergency preparedness and the related awareness and perceptions of
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healthcare providers. The research questions were answered through responses to the
Disaster Preparedness: Acute-Care Hospital Survey (Kaji et al., 2008), administered to
Tennessee ED nurse leaders (i.e., directors or managers; N = 108) as a sample of the ED
target population. The survey was a 73-question tool that was adapted to fit the particular
scope of this current research with the permission of the author (see Appendix B). The
overall sample in this research consisted of 51 participants, which represents a 47.2%
response rate—an adequate sample based upon sample size and power estimations, as
well as the common sample-size estimate of 10 to 15 responses per variable (see Field,
2009).
The variables used in this study were based upon information gained from the
literature review. The dependent variable is emergency preparedness, while the
independent variables were specified as the problems stream, policy stream, and politics
stream. These variables are described along with the study methodology, reflecting the
matrix involved in the construct of their roles as independent and response variables.
These constructs were examined for validity and assessed in correlation with the
covariance matrix for use in the regression models. The analysis tools, rationale, and
assumptions are detailed along with the results.
Interpretation of the Findings
The descriptive assessment of the study demographics characterizes the sample in
terms of gender, age, education, and geographic locale. A cross-sectional,
nonexperimental design was applied in the study. The majority of the participants were
female (72.5%), while the highest frequency by age group were 41 to 50 years of age
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(29.4%) and 31 to 40 years of age (27.4%). The majority of the participants had earned
either a Bachelor’s (47.1%) or Master’s (41.2%) degree as their highest educational
attainment. Although no demographics for ED nurse leaders could be located, a survey
conducted in 2019 on a sample of emergency, trauma, and transport nurses by
Schumaker, Taylor, and McGonigle found 78.8% of ED nurses to be female, with an
average age of 43.6 years. The educational demographic in my study was somewhat
different, with 60.4% possessing a Bachelor’s and 16.3% a Master’s degree. The
difference in educational preparation can be explained by the fact that many leadership
positions in nursing require a master’s degree to qualify, while this sample was staff
nurses.
Disaster-preparedness training was also reported, as was drill-practice experience
and disaster-response involvement. The majority of the respondents (74.5%) affirmed
participation in a specific form of disaster-preparedness training, while an estimated
60.8% reported participation in annual practice exercises or drills with multiagency
participation within their Tennessee healthcare institutions. In addition, an estimated
58.8% of the participants reported participating in a disaster response.
Overall, the participant responses to disaster-preparedness training, participation
in drill or practice exercise, and actual involvement in disaster/emergency events
illustrated an above-average awareness within the state of Tennessee based upon the
study sample. However, no data are available from previous assessments of the
Tennessee healthcare system and hospitals of disaster preparedness to affirm or negate
the conclusions drawn from the current study survey. Applying Kingdon’s (2003) theory
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of a small window of opportunity for each policy to move forward, the knowledge
without effective action to promote preparedness may indicate that the window of
opportunity was missed and another competing priority surpassed disaster preparedness.
This lack of existing research presents opportunities for further study to facilitate
effective policy development and to some extent may also explain the insufficiencies and
gaps found in the current status of Tennessee hospitals and the overall healthcare system
with regard to disaster preparedness.
In this study, I described the Tennessee healthcare system and available hospital
resources for disaster/emergency response. Regarding in-house radiation safety officers,
35.3% participants reported such a resource, while 45.1% reported one to two
decontamination showers or stalls within their facilities. The availability of negativepressure isolation rooms within their facilities or institutions was indicated by 31.4% of
the survey respondents. The resources required for a healthcare system to provide an
effective disaster/emergency response were found to be below average within the
institutions of this study sample. Despite the lack of comparable data, the findings in this
study clearly demonstrate gaps and resources too limited to meet the requirements for
effective disaster/emergency preparedness. The study results suggest the need for a
comprehensive statewide, ongoing evaluation of available resources for disaster/
emergency response within the Tennessee healthcare system, including hospital settings.
Developing and maintaining a Tennessee state healthcare emergency and disaster
surveillance and monitoring system could potentially lead to dramatic improvements.
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Research Question 1
Research Question 1 was as follows: How do perceptions of resource, training,
and budgetary problems relate to the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of
Tennessee? Application of a multiple linear regression model showed that the problem
variable was not significant.
Research Question 2
Research Question 2 was as follows: How do perceptions of federal, state, and
hospital policy and plans relate to the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of
Tennessee? Specifically, for a unit change or increase in perceived politics, a 0.54
increase in disaster/emergency preparedness within the Tennessee healthcare setting,
including hospitals, must be evident. Practically, the more often disaster/emergency
policy is perceived and reported, the better prepared the healthcare system, including
hospitals, is in addressing hospital emergencies and disasters. A correlation between
policy and emergency/disaster preparedness was observed, implying a direct correlation.
The perceived polices on disaster preparedness enhances the preparedness of the
healthcare institutions in addressing emergency and disaster. Specifically, based on the
regression equation, policy could be used to predict disaster or emergency preparedness,
implying that for 1 unit increase in policy, there was a 0.41 increase in disaster and
emergency preparedness perception units in the state of Tennessee healthcare system.
The more likely the disaster/emergency policy is perceived or known to be in place, the
better prepared the healthcare system, including hospitals, is in addressing hospital
emergencies and disasters. This finding is supported by previous literature (see Cliff et
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al., 2009), implying a direct correlation between perceived or known policy related to
disaster/emergency response and related preparedness. The findings are indicative of the
need to develop, implement, and evaluate policy on disaster/emergency preparedness
within the Tennessee healthcare system, including hospitals, for enhanced preparedness
and capabilities to effectively respond to disasters and emergencies.
Research Question 3
Research Question 3 was as follows: How do perceptions of external and internal
organizational politics relate to the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of
Tennessee? With a 1-unit change or increase in perceived politics, a 0.26 increase in
disaster/emergency preparedness perception units is indicated within the Tennessee
healthcare system, including hospitals. This finding corresponds with Kingdon’s (2011)
theory of politics because sudden and catastrophic acts of terrorism, mega storms, and
pandemics require, among other things, the heightened skills, equipment, and education
that will meet the needs of supporting organizations. These occurrences are random and
infrequent, and continuous preparedness is costly and labor intensive. Consequently, all
facets of the driving forces must be considered to increase understanding surrounding
organizational behavior as it relates to emergency preparedness. Practically, the more
often disaster/emergency politics are perceived and reported, the better prepared the
healthcare system, including hospitals, is in addressing hospital emergencies and
disasters. This finding is supported by previous literature (see Cliff et al., 2009), implying
a direct correlation between perceived politics related to disaster/emergency response and
related preparedness. The findings are suggestive of the need to examine the implication
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of politics in disaster/emergency preparedness and within the Tennessee healthcare
system, including hospitals, for enhanced preparedness and the capabilities necessary for
effective disaster/emergency response.
There were three independent or predictor variables used to address hospital
emergency and disaster preparedness, namely problem, policy and politics, implying the
prediction of emergency and disaster preparedness as dependent or response variable,
given these predictor variables. This model showed a significant correlation of these
predictors separately in a simple linear model, but in the multiple linear model, the
problem was not significant. However, although insignificant, there was a prediction of
emergency and disaster preparedness, given a perceived emergency and disaster
preparedness problem in this sample. Specifically, the problem related to emergency and
disaster preparedness could not be significantly used in this sample to predict emergency
and disaster preparedness. Because random error quantification is used in hypothesis
testing, it is possible that the observed insignificant prediction of hospital emergency and
disaster preparedness may be due to the marginalized sample size in the multiple linear
regression mode as a result of multiple comparison. Absence of evidence does not always
imply evidence of absence.
Because a single variable such as policy, which is significant in predicting
hospital emergency and disaster preparedness in this multiple linear modeling, does not
completely explain the observed the correlation, categorical variables such as education
and urbanity had a role as explanatory model. Education and/or the geographic locale of
the hospital setting as urbanity influenced the predictive effect of policy and politics as
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multiple predictors in hospital emergency and disaster preparedness. This multivariable
or multiple regression model is indicative of the significance of a Master’s degree and
suburban location of the healthcare system in the combined predictive effect of policy
and politics on hospital emergency and disaster preparedness. Specifically, the perception
of healthcare or health system emergency and disaster preparedness is influenced in this
sample by graduate education, namely a Master’s degree and the suburban location of the
hospital or healthcare system.
Limitations
Despite the strength of this research in identifying the needs of, and resources in,
hospitals and healthcare systems toward addressing disaster preparedness, limitations
exist. First, as a cross-sectional design, the findings and their applications may be
influenced by unmeasurable and residual confounding factors. However, it is highly
unlikely that the correlation between the dependent variable (i.e., disaster preparedness);
the independent variables (i.e., the problems, policy, and politics); and the predictability
of disaster preparedness by these variables is driven solely by these applications and
confounding factors. Regardless of how sophisticated a statistical software is to control
for confounding factors, residual factors persist (Holmes, 2009). Additionally, the
multivariable modeling in this study might be underpowered, given the requirement to
increase the sample size during the multiple-comparison phase of model specification and
analysis to avoid a Type I error rejecting a true null hypothesis. In effect the observed
inability of disaster and emergency related problem in predicting disaster preparedness
may be explained in part by the limited statistical power of the study.
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Implications and Social Change
The findings of this study contribute to social change by increasing understanding
of the actual state of preparedness perceived by ED nurse leaders within the state of
Tennessee. Identified gaps in this study namely policy and politics cause a shortfall when
preparedness is compared with expectations. The community at large expects that the
local hospital can manage any medical emergency and has no reason to believe otherwise
until actually faced with a disaster and systems are tested. Disaster preparedness is a
timely and relevant concern due to ongoing and, in some cases, unmitigable risk. Disaster
preparedness is innovative and interdisciplinary. Risks are variable and can have distinct
differences based upon many factors such as region, industry, and population density.
Implications to social change also include heightened awareness of policy
requirements, coupled with a standardized framework of inter-operational response
principles in a state of constant readiness. The quality and effectiveness of response in a
disaster situation can reduce the negative impact on communities and lives. A
standardized approach that holds to the tenets of all-hazards preparedness will leave no
question as to the capabilities of each hospital.
In this study, I identified the wide variation in levels of disaster/emergency
preparedness among the hospitals that participated in the research. Not only in the
perception of preparedness, but also in the actual availability of resources, the provision
of training, and the availability and content of policy. There are opportunities for creating
social change by improving the overall awareness of federal, state, and hospital policy, as
well as the associated expectations for hospital disaster preparedness. Similarly, with the
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enhancement of such awareness, perceptions of disaster preparedness can be influenced
in a positive manner.
With the knowledge gained from this study, recommendations can be made to
develop standards of preparation that will “bridge” the described gaps; create greater and
more accurate awareness; and support the development of standardized, comprehensive
emergency-preparedness systems. The ideal system will be better prepared to handle all
hazards and large-scale events. This research will serve as a tool in support of the
development of public policy that will enable an effective and sustainable system of
preparedness.
Future Research
In this study, I examined training, resources, experience, and drill and practice
exercise, as they relate to disaster preparedness as an exploratory or descriptive
component. The response from the statistically powered sample, although generalizable
to the targeted population, indicates a need for further studies to include statewide
hospitals in rural, urban, and suburban areas. Additionally, given restricted resources for
disaster/emergency preparedness, annual assessment of hospital capabilities in addressing
such preparedness is required.
Considerations for further study include the following aspects of the surveillance
and monitoring of hospital-emergency and disaster preparedness and response:
1. Number and level of trained radiation-safety staff within hospitals, monitored
depending upon the volume of care and number of patients served by the
healthcare system.
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2. Incidence and cumulative incidence of nosocomial infections and available
clinical guidelines in management and prevention including care-provider
handwashing.
3. The perceptions of chief executive officers and the board of directors
surrounding the need for capacity development in hospitals and healthcaresystem disaster/emergency preparedness.
4. Assessment of disaster/emergency preparedness, implementation, and
evaluation.
Overall, the current study is suggestive of a rigorous and continuous assessment
of training, education, and resources addressing hospital-emergency and disaster
preparedness. With such studies guiding future research, insufficiencies will be
addressed, and gaps will be narrowed within the state of Tennessee, thus improving
hospital disaster preparedness via published recommendations and updated requirements
meeting the national standard of care.
Recommendations
The findings of this study emerged through analysis of existing knowledge and
perceptions of the problems, policy, and politics associated with hospital-emergency and
disaster preparedness on the pathway toward enhancing disaster preparedness and
response within the Tennessee healthcare system including hospitals. These facilities are
underequipped when it comes to resources such as decontamination showers, negativepressure isolation rooms, and radiation-safety officers, especially within rural areas.
Consistent with the Kingdon’s (2003) theory of a window of opportunity to create
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interest in needed policy, the information gained from this research can be used as a
catalyst in creating awareness of the need for policy development.
The Tennessee healthcare system, including hospitals, is also limited with respect
to specific emergency training programs, mandatory disaster-preparedness education
requirements, quarterly multiagency drill or practice-exercise exposure, and the
state/local health-department contact and communication process. These observations
and the identified insufficiencies in disaster/emergency preparedness, as reported by the
study sample, are suggestive of an immediate need to establish a state of Tennessee
healthcare-system disaster/emergency-preparedness surveillance and monitoring system.
The overarching objective behind this study was to assess the impact or effect on
the Tennessee healthcare system, including hospitals, of problems, policy, and politics
related to disaster/emergency preparedness and response. Due to the sample size and
characteristics, further study is needed with (a) a larger sample stratified or blocked
according to geographic population size, comparing urban, suburban, and rural locales, as
well as the number of hospitals within these geographical areas; (b) hospital executive
directors and boards of directors; and (c) needs assessments from the state department of
health and the local health department on disaster/emergency training for Tennessee
healthcare systems including hospitals. First, since the current study size is not large
enough as initially anticipated, increasing the sample size will result in increase in the
power of the study as well as reliable generalizability. Secondly, the inclusion of a
hospital executive will allow for subpopulation analysis and a more reliable findings in
terms of reliability. Thirdly, in order for TN to implement policy in disaster emergency
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preparedness, the inclusion of the state health department in the survey allows for a more
reliable inference for policy change in disaster preparedness. The availability of reliable
and accurate data will result in intervention mapping conducive to consistent gap
narrowing in the knowledge, skills, and resources required for surveillance and
monitoring of hospital-emergency and disaster preparedness and response.
Conclusions
Self-report surveys can introduce information, selection, and misclassification
biases into the correlation between disaster preparedness and independent variables such
as the problems, policy, and politics associated with disasters/emergencies involving the
healthcare system including hospitals. Self-reported responses have a tendency to
introduce an estimated 20% observation bias within collected data (Smith & Noble,
2014). However, it is highly unlikely that the nexus between the response or dependent
variable and the independent or predictor variables in this study is driven solely by such
bias. This implies the accuracy and internal and external validity in the application of
these findings to healthcare systems including hospitals for the development of disasterpreparedness policy and guidelines and their implementation and evaluation. While
confounding factors are not bias, they result in a bias estimate between the independent
variable; the predictor or explanatory variables (i.e., the problems, policy, and politics);
and the dependent, response, or outcome variable (i.e., disaster preparedness).
Notwithstanding this potential in data modeling, it is unlikely that the observed point
estimates in the correlation and the linear regression applied in this study are driven
solely by these unmeasured confounding factors inherent to the survey data.
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In summary, the disaster preparedness of the Tennessee healthcare system,
including hospitals, directly correlates with the problems, policy, and politics associated
with disaster/emergency preparedness. Significantly, policy, and politics related to the
disaster/emergency preparedness of the healthcare system, including hospitals, are
predictive of disaster response after controlling for potentially confounding factors. These
findings are suggestive of the need for the state of Tennessee to address the issues
impacting hospital disaster preparedness in an effective manner through the creation of a
Tennessee healthcare system disaster/emergency-preparedness surveillance and
monitoring system.
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Appendix A: Study Survey

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS: ACUTE-CARE HOSPITAL SURVEY
BY: Kathleen Hirsch, RN, MSN, MBA

Length of time as an emergency-department (ED) nurse manager: ____________

Please circle the most accurate response:

1. Gender
A. Male
B. Female

2. Age
A. 21–30
B. 31–40
C. 41–50
D. 51–60
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E. 61–70

3. Academic Degree
A. Associate
B. Bachelor’s Degree
C. Master’s Degree
D. Doctorate

4. Have you had any specific training in emergency preparedness?
A. Yes
B. No

5. Do you know of any public policy that dictates the emergency preparedness of your
institution?
A. Yes
B. No

ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION

Please circle the most accurate response:

6. What is the number of licensed beds within your hospital?
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A. ˂ 50
B. 51–150
C. 150–299
D. 300+

7. How would you describe the area where your hospital is located?
A. Rural (i.e., outside a suburban area with a generally a low population)
B. Suburban (i.e., adjacent to or surrounding the center of an urban area)
C. Urban (i.e., the center of an incorporated community or municipality with a
population of 2,500 or greater)

8. How many miles travel is it to the nearest hospital?
A. 0–10
B. 11–25
C. 26–50
D. 50+

9.

When was the last time the disaster plan of your institution was updated or revised?
A. Within the last 2 years
B. More than 2 years ago
C. Never
D. Do not know
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10.

Is the contact number for the Tennessee Department of Health and the local County
Department of Health posted in a readily accessible location within the emergency
department?
A. Yes
B. No
C. Don’t know

11.

What methods are available during a disaster for staff to communicate with other
departments internally and also outside the facility?
A. Pager
B. Cell phone
C. Walkie-talkie
D. Intercom
E. High band/Low band/EMS radio
F. HAM radio
G. Other:

12.

How would you rate the capability of staff trained in the decontamination process?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
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E. Very good

13.

How would you rate the level of personal protective equipment
available within your institution, with self-contained breathing apparatus and
a fully encapsulated chemical-protection suit as the highest rating, and mask, gown,
gloves, and shoe covers as the lowest rating?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

14.

How many decontamination showers or stalls are available within your facility?
A. 1–2
B. 3–6
C. 7+
D. None
E. Don’t know

15.

Does your institution employ an in-house, radiation-safety officer who would be
available during a radiological event?
A. Yes
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B. No
C. Don’t know

16.

How many days of generic (i.e., nonpharmaceutical) supplies are maintained on
your site?
A. Less than 3
B. 3+
C. Don’t know

17.

How often does your hospital have a drill or practice disaster exercise with
multiagency participation (e.g., with emergency medical services, fire and rescue,
hazmat team, law enforcement, Department of Health, and/or other hospitals)?
A. Quarterly or more frequently
B. Annually
C. Every other year
D. Never

18.

When a disaster drill is conducted, how would you rate the critique or grade of the
drill by external observers?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
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D. Good
E. Very Good

19.

How would you rate the formal mechanism or policy to “trigger” activation of the
disaster plan of your institution?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

20.

Which of the following constitutes the primary reason for ED overcrowding within
your institution?
A. Increased ED patient volume
B. Lack of sufficient inpatient beds
C. Lack of nursing staff
D. Lack of primary-care services
E. Other
F. Don’t know

21.

Does your institution have a plan in place for mass fatalities?
A. Strongly disagree
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B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

22.

How many negative-pressure isolation beds do you have within your institution?
A. 1–2
B. 3–5
C. 6–10
D. 11–15
E. 16+

166

23.

Does your organization have a designated media-relations officer who can act as
a single point of information release in case of a disaster?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

24.

Are there engineers available within your institution to assess whether your facility
is safe for occupation in the event of a disaster?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

25.

In case of a disaster, does your institution have a “lock-down” policy in place,
mandating that all entrances and exits are secured?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree

167

E. Strongly agree

26.

Are there are any government requirements that direct hospital disaster
preparedness?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

27.

Does your institution offer an Employee Assistance Program or other programs to
treat posttraumatic stress and provide grief counselling to employees?
A. Yes
B. No
C. Don’t know

28.

Does your institution require mandatory education on disaster preparedness?
A. Yes
B. No
C. Don’t know

168

29.

How would you rate the disaster plan of your institution?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

30.

How would you rate the ability of your institution to utilize the Hospital Emergency
Incident Command System?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

31.

How would you rate the emergency-staff call-back plan of your institution?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good
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32.

How would you rate collaboration between your institution and the city or
community disaster/emergency committee?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

33.

How would you rate the special agreement or process your institution has in place
with vendors to obtain medical supplies during a disaster?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

34.

How would you rate the chemical-spill or decontamination team of your institution?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good
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35.

How would you rate the plans and procedures your institution has in place for the
evacuation of patients and personnel in case of a disaster?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

36.

How would you rate the ability of your institution to isolate or segregate
decontamination services from other patient areas?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

37.

How would you rate the ability of your institution to treat multiple patients exposed
to a nerve agent, with consideration to the amount of atropine, pralidoxime, or
duodote available?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
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D. Good
E. Very good

38.

How would you rate the ability of your institution to treat multiple patients with
cyanide exposure, with consideration to the number of cyanide kits the hospital has
available?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

39.

How would you rate the ability of your institution to assess radiological
contamination with a Geiger counter or other means?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good
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40.

How would you rate the level of disaster-preparedness training of residents,
hospitalists, and/or house officers within your institution?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

41.

How would you rate the level of training received by the ED staff of your institution
on biological weapons?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

42.

How would you rate the stockpile of antibiotics maintained by your institution for
disaster use?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
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E. Very good

43.

How would you rate the stockpile of pharmaceuticals set aside within your
institution to treat staff and families during a disaster?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

44.

How would you rate the ability of your institution to track fluctuations in the patient
census, patient complaints, and diagnoses (i.e., surveillance)?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good
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45.

How would you rate the ability of your institution to increase capacity during a
disaster (i.e., number of staffed beds in excess of routine operating capacity that
could be opened to increase disaster capacity)?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

46.

How would you rate the ability of your institution to reallocate or increase resources
during a disaster (e.g., cancel elective procedures or discharge inpatients early) to
make additional rooms available for inpatient use?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

47.

How well do you think your institution is prepared to provide support to staff and
healthcare providers in the event of a large-scale disaster?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
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C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

48.

How would you rate the ability of your institution to identify and manage victims of
bioterrorism?
A. Very poor
B. Poor
C. Neutral
D. Good
E. Very good

49.

What level of risk do you perceive exists for your acute-care hospital if faced with a
future disaster incident?
A. Very low
B. Poor
C. Neither low nor high
D. High
E. Very high
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50.

Are changes in the disaster policy of your institution driven by major events
across the country?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

51.

Do you feel your institution is adequately equipped to function during a disaster
emergency involving a radiologic attack?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

52.

Is your institution adequately equipped to function during a disaster emergency
involving a nuclear attack?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
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E. Strongly agree

53.

Do you feel your institution is adequately equipped to function during a disaster
emergency involving a biological-weapons attack?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree or disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

54.

Is your institution adequately equipped to function during a disaster emergency
involving a chemical-weapons attack?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree or disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree
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55.

Is your organization adequately equipped to function during an emergency
involving a natural disaster (e.g., hurricane, tornado, flood, or earthquake)?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

56.

Are you and other staff within your institution adequately trained to deal with
disaster outbreaks in your acute-care hospital?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

57.

Since 9/11, is your institution more prepared for a disaster incident?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree
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58.

As a healthcare worker, do you have confidence that your institution will protect
you during a disaster?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

59.

As a healthcare worker, do you view your community or institution as at risk for a
disaster incident?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree
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60.

Does your institution have adequate programs and policies in place to respond to a
large-scale disaster?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

61.

Do you view the risk of a disaster incident as serious and with the propensity to
adversely impact staff and patients?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

62.

As an ED manager or hospital executive, do you understand the responsibilities of
the hospital management team regarding disaster preparedness?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
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E. Strongly agree

63.

Overall, do you view your institution as having strong disaster-preparedness policy
in place and performing well in this area?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

64.

Overall, do you view your institution as equipped and prepared to respond to a
disaster in general (e.g., bioterrorism or natural, chemical, radiographic, or
nuclear)?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree
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65.

Overall, do you view your institution as prepared to provide support to staff and
other healthcare providers during a large-scale disaster?
A. Strongly disagree
B. Disagree
C. Neither agree nor disagree
D. Agree
E. Strongly agree

66.

When your hospital is experiencing a shortage in nurse staffing within the ED, how
often do you close some areas of the ED to maintain a nurse-patient ratio of 1:4?
A. Never
B. Rarely
C. Sometimes
D. Often
E. Always

67.

How many times per month does your hospital reach 100% operational capacity?
A. Never
B. Rarely
C. Sometimes
D. Often
E. Always
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68.

How often does your hospital divert ambulance traffic to other facilities?
A. Never
B. Rarely
C. Sometimes
D. Often
E. Always

69.

Does your hospital use agency nurses to expand nursing staff when necessary?
A. Never
B. Rarely
C. Sometimes
D. Often
E. Always

70.

When was the last time a disaster plan was initiated at your institution?
A. Within the last 2 years
B. More than 2 years ago
C. Never
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71.

Have you ever participated in a disaster response?
A. Yes
B. No
C. Don’t know

72.

How many disaster responses have you participated in while working at your
current healthcare facility?
A. One
B. Two
C. More than two?
D. Don’t know
E. None

73.

How many patients were treated during the largest disaster episode in which you
participated?
A. None
B. < 5
C . 5–10
D. > 10
E. Don’t know
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Appendix B: Survey Permission
January 17, 2012
Dear Dr. Kaji,
I communicated with you previously regarding the Disaster Preparedness Survey you
developed. I am a Ph.D. student at Walden University, majoring in public policy. I am
also the Vice President and Chief Nursing Officer of a large metropolitan hospital within
Nashville, Tennessee.
I plan to conduct a study for my doctoral program on hospital emergency preparedness,
related policy expectations, and care-provider perceptions of readiness. Emergencydepartment nurse managers will be sampled from all acute-care hospitals across the state
of Tennessee. I have conducted an extensive literature review that included your work.
Additionally, I have reviewed several survey tools and found your instrument best suited
to the needs and purpose of my study. It has the appropriate foundation and a range that
covers the topic without undue complexity.
I would like to ask for your permission to use the Disaster Preparedness Survey in my
study. Modification would involve a few added questions regarding perception and policy
expectations, as well as changes to any questions specific to the South Bay Area. I look
forward to your response and welcome any questions you may have regarding my
proposed study.
Thank you for your consideration.
Kathleen Hirsch
Doctoral Candidate, Walden University
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Appendix C: Constructs and Correlation Matrix
Constructs
Table C1
Correlation and Covariance of Variables in Disaster/Emergency Preparedness

Item test
Average interitem
Survey item
Sample size
correlation
correlation
Alpha
18
50
0.66
0.77
0.94
19
51
0.95
0.62
0.89
21
49
0.88
0.65
0.90
30
51
0.86
0.66
0.91
34
50
0.87
0.66
0.91
56
51
0.88
0.65
0.90
Note. The test scale is the mean or standardized item. The average interitem correlation
denotes the additive scale and represents the covariance (0.67), while 0.92 is the alpha
coefficient for the test scale based upon all variables within disaster/emergency
preparedness.
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Table C2
Correlation and Covariance of Variables in the Problems Construct of
Disaster/Emergency Preparedness

Item test
Average interitem
Survey item
Sample size
correlation
correlation
Alpha
45
51
0.87
0.84
0.95
51
50
0.90
0.81
0.95
56
50
0.95
0.77
0.93
63
50
0.92
0.80
0.94
64
51
0.95
0.78
0.93
Note. The test scale is the mean or the standardized item. The average interitem
correlation denotes the additive scale and represents the covariance (0.80), while 0.95 is
the alpha coefficient for the test scale based upon all variables within the construct of the
problems as the independent variable within the linear regression model.

Table C3
Correlation and Covariance of Variables in the Construct of Policy Related to
Disaster/Emergency Preparedness

Item test
Average interitem
Survey item
Sample size
correlation
correlation
Alpha
19
51
0.90
0.77
0.91
26
51
0.86
0.81
0.93
60
51
0.93
0.73
0.90
63
51
0.93
0.73
0.89
Note. The test scale is the mean or standardized item. The average interitem correlation
denotes the additive scale and represents the covariance (0.76), while 0.93 is the alpha
coefficient for the test scale based upon all variables within the construct of policy as the
independent variable within the linear regression model.
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Table C4
Correlation and Covariance of Variables in the Politics Construct Related to
Disaster/Emergency Preparedness
Item test
Average interitem
Survey item
Sample size
correlation
correlation
Alpha
23
50
0.88
0.19
0.32
50
51
0.63
0.89
0.89
63
50
0.85
0.28
0.44
Note. The test scale is the mean or standardized item. The average interitem correlation
denotes the additive scale and represents the covariance (0.43), while 0.69 is the alpha
coefficient for the test scale based upon all variables within the construct of politics as the
independent variable within the linear regression model.
Correlation Matrix
Table C5
Correlation Matrix on Disaster/Emergency Preparedness, Policy, Problems, and Politics

Variable

Disaster
preparedness
(DP)
r(p)

DP Policy

DP Problems

DP Politics

r(p)

r(p)

r(p)

1.00

0.94 (˂ .001)

0.92 (˂ .001)

0.88 (˂ .001)

DP Policy

0.94 (˂ .001)

1.00

0.94 (˂ .001)

0.85 (˂ .001)

DP Problems

0.92 (˂ .001)

0.94 (˂ .001)

1.00

0.89 (˂ .001)

Disaster/Emergency
preparedness

DP Politics
0.88 (˂ .001)
0.85 (˂ .001)
0.89 (˂ .001)
1.00
Note. The correlation coefficient was adjusted for multiple comparison using the
Bonferroni correction for Type I error inflation of the adjustment model. DP =
disaster/emergency preparedness, r = Pearson correlation coefficient; p = type I
error tolerance as probability value was set at .05.

